


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THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES


AMERICAN OPINION



Old Colony Trust Company
17 Court Street
52 Temple Place 222 Boylston Street
Boston, Massachusetts

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

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SPEECH OF
HENRY CABOT LODGE

SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE SENATE, AUGUST 12, 1919

MR. PRESIDENT, in the Essays of Elia, one of the most delightful is that entitled "Popular Fallacies." There is one very popular fallacy, however, which Lamb did not include in his list, and that is the common saying that history repeats itself. Universal negatives are always dangerous, but if there is anything which is fairly certain, it is that history never exactly repeats itself. Popular fallacies, nevertheless, generally have some basis, and this saying springs from the undoubted truth that mankind from generation to generation is constantly repeating itself. We have an excellent illustration of this fact in the proposed experiment now before us, of making arrangements to secure the permanent peace of the world. To assure the peace of the world by a combination of the nations is no new idea. Leaving out the leagues of antiquity and of mediæval times and going back no further than the treaty of Utrecht, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, we find that at that period a project of a treaty to establish perpetual peace was brought forward in 1713 by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. The treaty of Utrecht was to be the basis of an international system. A European league or Christian republic was to be set up, under which the members were to renounce the right of making war against each other and submit their disputes for arbitration to a central tribunal of the allies, the decisions of which were to be enforced by a common armament. I need not point out the resemblance between this theory and that which underlies the present league of nations. It was widely discussed during the eighteenth century,

receiving much support in public opinion; and Voltaire said that the nations of Europe, united by ties of religion, institutions, and culture, were really but a single family. The idea remained in an academic condition until 1791, when under the pressure of the French Revolution Count Kaunitz sent out a circular letter in the name of Leopold, of Austria, urging that it was the duty of all the powers to make common cause for the purpose of "preserving public peace, tranquillity of States, the inviolability of possession, and the faith of treaties," which has a very familiar sound. Napoleon had a scheme of his own for consolidating the great European peoples and establishing a central assembly, but the Napoleonic idea differed from that of the eighteenth century, as one would expect. A single great personality dominated and hovered over all. In 1804 the Emperor Alexander took up the question and urged a general treaty for the formation of a European confederation. "Why could one not submit to it," the Emperor asked, "the positive rights of nations, assure the privilege of neutrality, insert the obligation of never beginning war until all the resources which the mediation of a third party could offer have been exhausted, until the grievances have by this means been brought to light, and an effort to remove them has been made? On principles such as these one could proceed to a general pacification, and give birth to a league of which the stipulations would form, so to speak, a new code of the law of nations, while those who should try to infringe it would risk bringing upon themselves the forces of the new union."

The Emperor, moved by more immediately alluring visions, put aside this scheme at the treaty of Tilsit and then decided that peace could best be restored to the world by having two all-powerful emperors, one of the east and one of the west. After the Moscow campaign, however, he returned to his early dream. Under the influence of the Baroness von Krudener he became a devotee of a certain mystic pietism which for some time guided his public acts, and I think it may be fairly said that his liberal and popular ideas of that period, however vague and uncertain, were sufficiently genuine. Based upon the treaties of alliance against France, those of

Chaumont and of Vienna, was the final treaty of Paris, of November 20, 1915. In the preamble the signatories, who were Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, stated that it is the purpose of the ensuing treaty and their desire "to employ all their means to prevent the general tranquillity — the object of the wishes of mankind and the constant end of their efforts — from being again disturbed; desirous, moreover, to draw closer the ties which unite them for the common interests of their people, have resolved to give to the principles solemnly laid down in the treaties of Chaumont of March 1, 1814, and of Vienna of March 25, 1815, the application the most analogous to the present state of affairs, and to fix beforehand by a solemn treaty the principles which they propose to follow, in order to guarantee Europe from dangers by which she may still be menaced."

Then follow five articles which are devoted to an agreement to hold France in control and check, based largely on other more detailed agreements. But in Article 6 it is said:

To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present treaty, and to consolidate the connections which at the present moment so closely unite the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the high contracting parties have agreed to renew their meeting at fixed periods, either under the immediate auspices of the sovereigns themselves, or by their respective ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

Certainly nothing could be more ingenuous or more praiseworthy than the purposes of the alliance then formed, and yet it was this very combination of powers which was destined to grow into what has been known, and we might add cursed, throughout history as the Holy Alliance.

As early as 1818 it had become apparent that upon this innocent statement might be built an alliance which was to be used to suppress the rights of nationalities and every attempt of any oppressed people to secure their freedom. Lord Castlereagh was a Tory of the Tories, but at that time, only three years after the treaty of Paris, when the representatives of the alliance met at Aix-la-Chapelle, he began to suspect that this new

European system was wholly inconsistent with the liberties to which Englishmen of all types were devoted. At the succeeding meetings, at Troppau and Laibach, his suspicion was confirmed, and England began to draw away from her partners. He had indeed determined to break with the alliance before the Congress of Verona, but his death threw the question into the hands of George Canning, who stands forth as the man who separated Great Britain from the combination of the continental powers. The attitude of England, which was defined in a memorandum where it was said that nothing could be more injurious to the idea of government generally than the belief that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of an established power without any consideration of the extent to which it was to be abused, led to a compromise in 1818 in which it was declared that it was the intention of the five powers, France being invited to adhere, "to maintain the intimate union, strengthened by the ties of Christian brotherhood, contracted by the sovereigns; to pronounce the object of this union to be the preservation of peace on the basis of respect for treaties." Admirable and gentle words these, setting forth purposes which all men must approve.

In 1820 the British Government stated that they were prepared to fulfill all treaty obligations, but that if it was desired "to extend the alliance so as to include all objects, present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its character to such an extent and carry us so far that we should see in it an additional motive for adhering to our course at the risk of seeing the alliance move away from us, without our having quitted it." The Czar Alexander abandoned his Liberal theories and threw himself into the arms of Metternich, as mean a tyrant as history can show, whose sinister designs probably caused as much misery and oppression in the years which followed as have ever been evolved by one man of second-rate abilities. The three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, then put out a famous protocol in which it was said that the "States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other States, ipso facto cease to be members of

the European alliance and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guaranties for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or, if need be, by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the great alliance." To this point had the innocent and laudable declarations of the treaty of Paris already developed. In 1822 England broke away, and Canning made no secret of his pleasure at the breach. In a letter to the British minister at St. Petersburg he said:

So things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself, and God for us all. The time for Areopagus, and the like of that, is gone by.

He also said, in the same year, 1823:

What is the influence we have had in the counsels of the alliance, and which Prince Metternich exhorts us to be so careful not to throw away? We protested at Laibach; we remonstrated at Verona. Our protest was treated as waste paper; our remonstrances mingled with the air. Our influence, if it is to be maintained abroad, must be secured in the source of strength at home; and the sources of that strength are in the sympathy between the people and the Government; in the union of the public sentiment with the public counsels; in the reciprocal confidence and coöperation of the House of Commons and the Crown.

These words of Canning are as applicable and as weighty now as when they were uttered and as worthy of consideration.

The Holy Alliance, thus developed by the three continental powers and accepted by France under the Bourbons, proceeded to restore the inquisition in Spain, to establish the Neapolitan Bourbons, who for 40 years were to subject the people of southern Italy to one of the most detestable tyrannies ever known, and proposed further to interfere against the colonies in South America which had revolted from Spain and to have their case submitted to a congress of the powers. It was then that Canning made his famous statement, "We have called a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old." It was at this point also that the United States intervened. The famous message of Monroe, sent to Congress on December 2, 1823, put an end to any danger of European influence in the American Continents. A dis-

tinguished English historian, Mr. William Alison Phillips, says:

The attitude of the United States effectually prevented the attempt to extend the dictatorship of the alliance beyond the bounds of Europe, in itself a great service to mankind.

In 1825 Great Britain recognized the South American Republics. So far as the New World was concerned the Holy Alliance had failed. It was deprived of the support of France by the revolution of 1830, but it continued to exist under the guidance of Metternich and its last exploit was in 1849, when the Emperor Nicholas sent a Russian army into Hungary to crush out the struggle of Kossuth for freedom and independence.

I have taken the trouble to trace in the merest outline the development of the Holy Alliance, so hostile and dangerous to human freedom, because I think it carries with it a lesson for us at the present moment, showing as it does what may come from general propositions and declarations of purposes in which all the world agrees. Turn to the preamble of the covenant of the league of nations now before us, which states the object of the league. It is formed "in order to promote international coöperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international laws as the actual rule of conduct among governments and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another."

No one would contest the loftiness or the benevolence of these purposes. Brave words, indeed! They do not differ essentially from the preamble of the treaty of Paris, from which sprang the Holy Alliance. But the covenant of this league contains a provision which I do not find in the treaty of Paris, and which is as follows:

The assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world.

There is no such sweeping or far-reaching provision as that in the treaty of Paris, and yet able men developed

from that treaty the Holy Alliance, which England, and later France, were forced to abandon and which, for thirty-five years, was an unmitigated curse to the world. England broke from the Holy Alliance and the breach began three years after it was formed, because English statesmen saw that it was intended to turn the alliance — and this league is an alliance — into a means of repressing internal revolutions or insurrections. There was nothing in the treaty of Paris which warranted such action, but in this covenant of the league of nations the authority is clearly given in the third paragraph of Article 3, where it is said:

The assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world.

No revolutionary movement, no internal conflict of any magnitude can fail to affect the peace of the world. The French Revolution, which was wholly internal at the beginning, affected the peace of the world to such an extent that it brought on a world war which lasted some twenty-five years. Can anyone say that our Civil War did not affect the peace of the world? At this very moment, who would deny that the condition of Russia, with internal conflicts raging in all parts of that great Empire, does not affect the peace of the world and therefore come properly within the jurisdiction of the league. "Any matter affecting the peace of the world" is a very broad statement which could be made to justify almost any interference on the part of the league with the internal affairs of other countries. That this fair and obvious interpretation is the one given to it abroad is made perfectly apparent in the direct and vigorous statement of M. Clemenceau in his letter to Mr. Paderewski, in which he takes the ground in behalf of the Jews and other nationalities in Poland that they should be protected, and where he says that the associated powers would feel themselves bound to secure guaranties in Poland "of certain essential rights which will afford to the inhabitants the necessary protection, whatever changes may take place in the internal constitution of the Polish Republic." He contemplates and defends interference with the internal affairs of Poland — among other things — in

behalf of a complete religious freedom, a purpose with which we all deeply sympathize. These promises of the French prime minister are embodied in effective clauses in the treaties with Germany and with Poland and deal with the internal affairs of nations, and their execution is intrusted to the "principal allied and associated powers"; that is, to the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. This is a practical demonstration of what can be done under Article 3 and under Article 11 of the league covenant, and the authority which permits interference in behalf of religious freedom, an admirable object, is easily extended to the repression of internal disturbances which may well prove a less admirable purpose. If Europe desires such an alliance or league with a power of this kind, so be it. I have no objection, provided they do not interfere with the American Continents or force us against our will but bound by a moral obligation into all the quarrels of Europe. If England, abandoning the policy of Canning, desires to be a member of a league which has such powers as this, I have not a word to say. But I object in the strongest possible way to having the United States agree, directly or indirectly, to be controlled by a league which may at any time, and perfectly lawfully and in accordance with the terms of the covenant, be drawn in to deal with internal conflicts in other countries, no matter what those conflicts may be. We should never permit the United States to be involved in any internal conflict in another country, except by the will of her people expressed through the Congress which represents them.

With regard to wars of external aggression on a member of the league the case is perfectly clear. There can be no genuine dispute whatever about the meaning of the first clause of Article 10. In the first place, it differs from every other obligation in being individual and placed upon each nation without the intervention of the league. Each nation for itself promises to respect and preserve as against external aggression the boundaries and the political independence of every member of the league. Of the right of the United States to give such a guaranty I have never had the slightest doubt, and the elaborate arguments which have been made here and the learning

which has been displayed about our treaty with Granada, now Colombia, and with Panama, were not necessary for me, because, I repeat, there can be no doubt of our right to give a guaranty to another nation that we will protect its boundaries and independence. The point I wish to make is that the pledge is an individual pledge. We have, for example, given guaranties to Panama and for obvious and sufficient reasons. The application of that guaranty would not be in the slightest degree affected by ten or twenty other nations giving the same pledge if Panama, when in danger, appealed to us to fulfill our obligation. We should be bound to do so without the slightest reference to the other guarantors. In Article 10 the United States is bound on the appeal of any member of the league not only to respect but to preserve its independence and its boundaries, and that pledge, if we give it, must be fulfilled.

There is to me no distinction whatever in a treaty between what some persons are pleased to call legal and moral obligations. A treaty rests and must rest, except where it is imposed under duress and securities and hostages are taken for its fulfillment, upon moral obligations. No doubt a great power impossible of coercion can cast aside a moral obligation if it sees fit and escape from the performance of the duty which it promises. The pathway of dishonor is always open. I, for one, however, can not conceive of voting for a clause of which I disapprove because I know it can be escaped in that way. Whatever the United States agrees to, by that agreement she must abide. Nothing could so surely destroy all prospects of the world's peace as to have any powerful nation refuse to carry out an obligation, direct or indirect, because it rests only on moral grounds. Whatever we promise we must carry out to the full, "without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." To me any other attitude is inconceivable. Without the most absolute and minute good faith in carrying out a treaty to which we have agreed, without ever resorting to doubtful interpretations or to the plea that it is only a moral obligation, treaties are worthless. The greatest foundation of peace is the scrupulous observance of every promise, express or implied, of every pledge, whether it can be

described as legal or moral. No vote should be given to any clause in any treaty or to any treaty except in this spirit and with this understanding.

I return, then, to the first clause of Article 10. It is, I repeat, an individual obligation. It requires no action on the part of the league, except that in the second sentence the authorities of the league are to have the power to advise as to the means to be employed in order to fulfill the purpose of the first sentence. But that is a detail of execution, and I consider that we are morally and in honor bound to accept and act upon that advice. The broad fact remains that if any member of the league suffering from external aggression should appeal directly to the United States for support the United States would be bound to give that support in its own capacity and without reference to the action of other powers because the United States itself is bound, and I hope the day will never come when the United States will not carry out its promises. If that day should come, and the United States or any other great country should refuse, no matter how specious the reasons, to fulfill both in letter and spirit every obligation in this covenant, the United States would be dishonored and the league would crumble into dust, leaving behind it a legacy of wars. (If China should rise up and attack Japan in an effort to undo the great wrong of the cession of the control of Shantung to that power, we should be bound under the terms of Article 10 to sustain Japan against China, and a guaranty of that sort is never invoked except when the question has passed beyond the stage of negotiation and has become a question for the application of force. I do not like the prospect. It shall not come into existence by any vote of mine.)

Article 11 carries this danger still further, for it says:

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the league or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole league and the league shall take any action that shall be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

“Any war or threat of war” — that means both external aggression and internal disturbance, as I have already pointed out in dealing with Article 3. “Any action” covers military action, because it covers action

of any sort or kind. Let me take an example, not an imaginary case, but one which may have been overlooked because most people have not the slightest idea where or what a King of the Hedjaz is. The following dispatch appeared recently in the newspapers:

HEDJAZ AGAINST BEDOUINS.

The forces of Emir Abdullah recently suffered a grave defeat, the Wahabis attacking and capturing Kurma, east of Mecca. Ibn Savond is believed to be working in harmony with the Wahabis. A squadron of the royal air force was ordered recently to go to the assistance of King Hussein.

Hussein I take to be the Sultan of Hedjaz. He is being attacked by the Bedouins, as they are known to us, although I fancy the general knowledge about the Wahabis and Ibn Savond and Emir Abdullah is slight and the names mean but little to the American people. Nevertheless, here is a case of a member of the league — for the King of Hedjaz is such a member in good and regular standing and signed the treaty by his representatives, Mr. Rustem Haidar and Mr. Abdul Havi Aouni.

Under Article 10, if King Hussein appealed to us for aid and protection against external aggression affecting his independence and the boundaries of his Kingdom, we should be bound to give that aid and protection and to send American soldiers to Arabia. It is not relevant to say that this is unlikely to occur; that Great Britain is quite able to take care of King Hussein, who is her fair creation, reminding one a little of the Mosquito King, a monarch once developed by Great Britain on the Mosquito Coast of Central America. The fact that we should not be called upon does not alter the right which the King of Hedjaz possesses to demand the sending of American troops to Arabia in order to preserve his independence against the assaults of the Wahabis or Bedouins. I am unwilling to give that right to King Hussein, and this illustrates the point which is to me the most objectionable in the league as it stands; the right of other powers to call out American troops and American ships to go to any part of the world, an obligation we are bound to fulfill under the terms of this treaty. I know the answer well — that of course they could not be sent without action by Congress. Congress would have no choice if acting in good faith, and if under Article 10 any

member of the league summoned us, or if under Article 11 the league itself summoned us, we should be bound in honor and morally to obey. There would be no escape except by a breach of faith, and legislation by Congress under those circumstances would be a mockery of independent action. Is it too much to ask that provision should be made that American troops and American ships should never be sent anywhere or ordered to take part in any conflict except after deliberate action of the American people, expressed according to the Constitution through their chosen representatives in Congress?

Let me now briefly point out the insuperable difficulty which I find in Article 15. It begins: "If there should arise between members of the league any dispute likely to lead to a rupture." "Any dispute" covers every possible dispute. It therefore covers a dispute over tariff duties and over immigration. Suppose we have a dispute with Japan or with some European country as to immigration. I put aside tariff duties as less important than immigration. This is not an imaginary case. Of late years there has probably been more international discussion and negotiation about questions growing out of immigration laws than any other one subject. It comes within the definition of "any dispute" at the beginning of Article 15. In the eighth paragraph of that Article it is said that "if the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which, by international law, is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the council shall so report and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement." That is one of the statements, of which there are several in this treaty, where words are used which it is difficult to believe their authors could have written down in seriousness. They seem to have been put in for the same purpose as what is known in natural history as protective coloring. Protective coloring is intended so to merge the animal, the bird, or the insect in its background that it will be indistinguishable from its surroundings and difficult, if not impossible, to find the elusive and hidden bird, animal, or insect. Protective coloring here is used in the form of words to give an impression that we are perfectly safe upon immigration

and tariffs, for example, because questions which international law holds to be solely within domestic jurisdiction are not to have any recommendation from the council, but the dangers are there just the same, like the cunningly colored insect on the tree or the young bird crouching motionless upon the sand. The words and the coloring are alike intended to deceive. I wish somebody would point out to me those provisions of international law which make a list of questions which are hard and fast within the domestic jurisdiction. No such distinction can be applied to tariff duties or immigration, nor indeed finally and conclusively to any subject. Have we not seen the school laws of California, most domestic of subjects, rise to the dignity of a grave international dispute? No doubt both import duties and immigration are primarily domestic questions, but they both constantly involve and will continue to involve international effects. Like the protective coloration, this paragraph is wholly worthless unless it is successful in screening from the observer the existence of the animal, insect, or bird which it is desired to conceal. It fails to do so and the real object is detected. But even if this bit of deception was omitted — and so far as the question of immigration or tariff questions are concerned it might as well be — the ninth paragraph brings the important point clearly to the front. Immigration, which is the example I took, can not escape the action of the league by any claim of domestic jurisdiction; it has too many international aspects.

Article 9 says:

The council may, in any case under this article, refer the dispute to the assembly.

We have our dispute as to immigration with Japan or with one of the Balkan States, let us say. The council has the power to refer the dispute to the assembly. Moreover the dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the council. So that Japan or the Balkan States, for example, with which we may easily have the dispute, ask that it be referred to the assembly and the

immigration question between the United States and Jugoslavia or Japan, as the case may be, goes to the assembly. The United States and Japan or Jugoslavia are excluded from voting and the provision of Article 12, relating to the action and powers of the council, apply to the action and powers of the assembly provided, as set forth in Article 15, that a report made by the assembly "if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the league represented on the council and of a majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute." This course of procedure having been pursued, we find the question of immigration between the United States and Japan is before the assembly for decision. The representatives of the council, except the delegates of the United States and of Japan or Jugoslavia, must all vote unanimously upon it as I understand it, but a majority of the entire assembly, where the council will have only seven votes, will decide. Can anyone say beforehand what the decision of that assembly will be, in which the United States and Jugoslavia or Japan will have no vote? The question in one case may affect immigration from every country in Europe, although the dispute exists only for one, and in the other the whole matter of Asiatic immigration is involved. Is it too fanciful to think that it might be decided against us? For my purpose it matters not whether it is decided for or against us. An immigration dispute or a dispute over tariff duties, met by the procedure set forth in Article 15, comes before the assembly of delegates for a decision by what is practically a majority vote of the entire assembly. That is something to which I do not find myself able to give my assent. So far as immigration is concerned, and also so far as tariff duties, although less important, are concerned, I deny the jurisdiction. There should be no possibility of other nations deciding who shall come into the United States, or under what conditions they shall enter. The right to say who shall come into a country is one of the very highest attributes of sovereignty.

If a nation can not say without appeal who shall come within its gates and become a part of its citizenship it has ceased to be a sovereign nation. It has become a tributary and a subject nation, and it makes no difference whether it is subject to a league or to a conqueror.

If other nations are willing to subject themselves to such a domination, the United States, to which many immigrants have come and many more will come, ought never to submit to it for a moment. They tell us that so far as Asiatic emigration is concerned there is not the slightest danger that that will ever be forced upon us by the league, because Australia and Canada and New Zealand are equally opposed to it. I think it highly improbable that it would be forced upon us under those conditions, but it is by no means impossible. It is true the United States has one vote and that England, if you count the King of the Hedjaz, has seven — in all eight — votes; yet it might not be impossible for Japan and China and Siam to rally enough other votes to defeat us; but whether we are protected in that way or not does not matter. The very offering of that explanation accepts the jurisdiction of the league, and personally, I can not consent to putting the protection of my country and of her workingmen against undesirable immigration out of our own hands. We and we alone must say who shall come into the United States and become citizens of this Republic, and no one else should have any power to utter one word in regard to it.

. Article 21 says:

Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.

The provision did not appear in the first draft of the covenant, and when the President explained the second draft of the convention to the peace conference he said:

Article 21 is new.

And that was all he said. No one can question the truth of the remark, but I trust I shall not be considered disrespectful if I say that it was not an illuminating statement. The article was new, but the fact of its novelty, which the President declared, was known to

everyone who had taken the trouble to read the two documents. We were not left, however, without a fitting explanation. The British delegation took it upon themselves to explain Article 21 at some length, and this is what they said:

Article 21 makes it clear that the covenant is not intended to abrogate or weaken any other agreements, so long as they are consistent with its own terms, into which members of the league may have entered or may hereafter enter for the assurance of peace. Such agreements would include special treaties for compulsory arbitration and military conventions that are genuinely defensive.

The Monroe doctrine and similar understandings are put in the same category. They have shown themselves in history to be not instruments of national ambition, but guarantees of peace. The origin of the Monroe doctrine is well known. It was proclaimed in 1823 to prevent America from becoming a theater for intrigues of European absolutism. At first a principle of American foreign policy, it has become an international understanding, and it is not illegitimate for the people of the United States to say that the covenant should recognize that fact.

In its essence it is consistent with the spirit of the covenant, and, indeed, the principles of the league, as expressed in Article 10, represent the extension to the whole world of the principles of the doctrine, while, should any dispute as to the meaning of the latter ever arise between the American and European powers, the league is there to settle it.

The explanation of Great Britain received the assent of France.

It seems to me monumentally paradoxical and a trifle infantile —

Says M. Lausanne, editor of the *Matin* and a chief spokesman for M. Clemenceau —

to pretend the contrary.

When the executive council of the league of nations fixes the "reasonable limits of the armament of Peru"; when it shall demand information concerning the naval program of Brazil (Art. 7 of the covenant); when it shall tell Argentina what shall be the measure of the "contribution to the armed forces to protect the signature of the social covenant" (Art. 16); when it shall demand the immediate registration of the treaty between the United States and Canada at the seat of the league, it will control, whether it wills or not, the destinies of America.

And when the American States shall be obliged to take a hand in every war or menace of war in Europe (Art. 11) they will necessarily fall afoul of the fundamental principle laid down by Monroe.

* * * If the league takes in the world, then Europe must mix in the affairs of America; if only Europe is included, then America will violate of necessity her own doctrine by intermixing in the affairs of Europe.

It has seemed to me that the British delegation traveled a little out of the precincts of the peace conference when they undertook to explain the Monroe doctrine and tell the United States what it was and what it was not pro-

posed to do with it under the new article. That, however, is merely a matter of taste and judgment. Their statement that the Monroe doctrine under this article, if any question arose in regard to it, would be passed upon and interpreted by the league of nations is absolutely correct. There is no doubt that this is what the article means. Great Britain so stated it, and no American authority, whether friendly or unfriendly to the league, has dared to question it. I have wondered a little why it was left to the British delegation to explain that article, which so nearly concerns the United States, but that was merely a fugitive thought upon which I will not dwell. The statement of M. Lausanne is equally explicit and truthful, but he makes one mistake. He says, in substance, that if we are to meddle in Europe, Europe can not be excluded from the Americas. He overlooks the fact that the Monroe doctrine also says:

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of the powers.

The Monroe doctrine was the corollary of Washington's neutrality policy and of his injunction against permanent alliances. It reiterates and reaffirms the principle. We do not seek to meddle in the affairs of Europe and keep Europe out of the Americas. It is as important to keep the United States out of European affairs as to keep Europe out of the American Continents. Let us maintain the Monroe doctrine, then, in its entirety, and not only preserve our own safety, but in this way best promote the real peace of the world. Whenever the preservation of freedom and civilization and the overthrow of a menacing world conqueror summon us we shall respond fully and nobly, as we did in 1917. He who doubts that we should do so has little faith in America. But let it be our own act and not done reluctantly by the coercion of other nations, at the bidding or by the permission of other countries.

Let me now deal with the article itself. We have here some protective coloration again. The Monroe doctrine is described as a "regional understanding," whatever that may mean. The boundaries between the States of

the Union, I suppose, are "regional understandings," if anyone chooses to apply to them that somewhat swollen phraseology. But the Monroe doctrine is no more a regional understanding than it is an "international engagement." The Monroe doctrine was a policy declared by President Monroe. Its immediate purpose was to shut out Europe from interfering with the South American Republics, which the Holy Alliance designed to do. It was stated broadly, however, as we all know, and went much further than that. It was, as I have just said, the corollary of Washington's declaration against our interfering in European questions. It was so regarded by Jefferson at the time and by John Quincy Adams, who formulated it, and by President Monroe, who declared it. It rested firmly on the great law of self-preservation, which is the basic principle of every independent State.

It is not necessary to trace its history or to point out the extensions which it has received or its universal acceptance by all American statesmen without regard to party. All Americans have always been for it. They may not have known its details or read all the many discussions in regard to it, but they knew that it was an American doctrine and that, broadly stated, it meant the exclusion of Europe from interference with American affairs and from any attempt to colonize or set up new States within the boundaries of the American Continent. I repeat it was purely an American doctrine, a purely American policy, designed and wisely designed for our defense. It has never been an "international engagement." No nation has ever formally recognized it. It has been the subject of reservation at international conventions by American delegates. It has never been a "regional understanding" or an understanding of any kind with anybody. It was the declaration of the United States of America, in their own behalf, supported by their own power. They brought it into being, and its life was predicated on the force which the United States could place behind it. Unless the United States could sustain it, it would die. The United States has supported it. It has lived — strong, efficient, respected. It is now proposed to kill it by a provision in a treaty for a league of nations.

The instant that the United States, who declared, interpreted, and sustained the doctrine, ceases to be the sole judge of what it means, that instant the Monroe doctrine ceases and disappears from history and from the face of the earth. I think it is just as undesirable to have Europe interfere in American affairs now as Mr. Monroe thought it was in 1823, and equally undesirable that we should be compelled to involve ourselves in all the wars and brawls of Europe. The Monroe doctrine has made for peace. Without the Monroe doctrine we should have had many a struggle with European powers to save ourselves from possible assault and certainly from the necessity of becoming a great military power, always under arms and always ready to resist invasion from States in our near neighborhood. In the interests of the peace of the world it is now proposed to wipe away this American policy, which has been a bulwark and a barrier for peace. With one exception it has always been successful, and then success was only delayed. When we were torn by civil war France saw fit to enter Mexico and endeavored to establish an empire there. When our hands were once free the empire perished, and with it the unhappy tool of the third Napoleon. If the United States had not been rent by civil war no such attempt would have been made, and nothing better illustrates the value to the cause of peace of the Monroe doctrine. Why, in the name of peace, should we extinguish it? Why, in the name of peace, should we be called upon to leave the interpretation of the Monroe doctrine to other nations? It is an American policy. It is our own. It has guarded us well, and I, for one, can never find consent in my heart to destroy it by a clause in a treaty and hand over its body for dissection to the nations of Europe. If we need authority to demonstrate what the Monroe doctrine has meant to the United States we can not do better than quote the words of Grover Cleveland, who directed Mr. Olney to notify the world that "to-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law to which it confines its interposition." Theodore Roosevelt, in the last article written before his death, warned us, his countrymen, that we are "in honor bound to keep ourselves so prepared that the Monroe doctrine

shall be accepted as immutable international law." Grover Cleveland was a Democrat and Theodore Roosevelt was a Republican, but they were both Americans, and it is the American spirit which has carried this country always to victory and which should govern us to-day, and not the international spirit which would in the name of peace hand the United States over bound hand and foot to obey the fiat of other powers.

Another point in this covenant where change must be made in order to protect the safety of the United States in the future is in Article 1, where withdrawal is provided for. This provision was an attempt to meet the very general objection to the first draft of the league, that there was no means of getting out of it without denouncing the treaty; that is, there was no arrangement for the withdrawal of any nation. As it now stands it reads that —

Any member of the league may, after two years' notice of its intention to do so, withdraw from the league, provided that all its international obligations, and all its obligations under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

The right of withdrawal is given by this clause, although the time for notice, two years, is altogether too long. Six months or a year would be found, I think, in most treaties to be the normal period fixed for notice of withdrawal. But whatever virtue there may be in the right thus conferred is completely nullified by the proviso. The right of withdrawal can not be exercised until all the international obligations and all the obligations of the withdrawing nations have been fulfilled. The league alone can decide whether "all international obligations and all obligations under this covenant" have been fulfilled, and this would require, under the provisions of the league, a unanimous vote, so that any nation desiring to withdraw could not do so, even on the two years' notice, if one nation voted that the obligations had not been fulfilled. Remember that this gives the league not only power to review all our obligations under the covenant but all our treaties with all nations for every one of those is an "international obligation."

Are we deliberately to put ourselves in fetters and be examined by the league of nations as to whether we have

kept faith with Cuba or Panama before we can be permitted to leave the league? This seems to me humiliating to say the least. The right of withdrawal, if it is to be of any value whatever, must be absolute, because otherwise a nation desiring to withdraw could be held in the league by objections from other nations until the very act which induces the nation to withdraw had been completed; until the withdrawing nation had been forced to send troops to take part in a war with which it had no concern and upon which it did not desire to enter. It seems to me vital to the safety of the United States not only that this provision should be eliminated and the right to withdraw made absolute but that the period of withdrawal should be much reduced. As it stands it is practically no better in this respect than the first league draft which contained no provision for withdrawal at all, because the proviso here inserted so incumbers it that every nation to all intents and purposes must remain a member of the league indefinitely unless all the other members are willing that it should retire. Such a provision as this, ostensibly framed to meet the objection, has the defect which other similar gestures to give an impression of meeting objections have, that it apparently keeps the promise to the ear but most certainly breaks it to the hope.

I have dwelt only upon those points which seem to me most dangerous. There are, of course, many others, but these points, in the interest not only of the safety of the United States but of the maintenance of the treaty and the peace of the world, should be dealt with here before it is too late. Once in the league the chance of amendment is so slight that it is not worth considering. Any analysis of the provisions of this league covenant, however, brings out in startling relief one great fact. Whatever may be said, it is not a league of peace; it is an alliance, dominated at the present moment by five great powers, really by three, and it has all the marks of an alliance. The development of international law is neglected. The court which is to decide disputes brought before it fills but a small place. The conditions for which this league really provides with the utmost care are political conditions, not judicial questions, to be reached

by the executive council and the assembly, purely political bodies without any trace of a judicial character about them. Such being its machinery, the control being in the hands of political appointees whose votes will be controlled by interest and expediency, it exhibits that most marked characteristic of an alliance—that its decisions are to be carried out by force. Those articles upon which the whole structure rests are articles which provide for the use of force; that is, for war. This league to enforce peace does a great deal for enforcement and very little for peace. It makes more essential provisions looking to war than to peace, for the settlement of disputes.

Article 10 I have already discussed. There is no question that the preservation of a State against external aggression can contemplate nothing but war. In Article 11, again, the league is authorized to take any action which may be necessary to safeguard the peace of the world. "Any action" includes war. We also have specific provisions for a boycott, which is a form of economic warfare. The use of troops might be avoided but the enforcement of a boycott would require blockades in all probability and certainly a boycott in its essence is simply an effort to starve a people into submission, to ruin their trade, and, in the case of nations which are not self-supporting, to cut off their food supply. The misery and suffering caused by such a measure as this may easily rival that caused by actual war. Article 16 embodies the boycott and also, in the last paragraph, provides explicitly for war. We are told that the word "recommend" has no binding force; it constitutes a moral obligation, that is all. But it means that if we, for example, should refuse to accept the recommendation that we should nullify the operation of Article 16 and, to that extent, of the league. It seems to me that to attempt to relieve us of clearly imposed duties by saying that the word "recommend" is not binding is an escape of which no nation regarding the sanctity of treaties and its own honor would care to avail itself. The provisions of Article 16 are extended to States outside the league who refuse to obey its command to come in and submit themselves to its jurisdiction; another provision for war.

Taken altogether, these provisions for war present what to my mind is the gravest objection to this league in its present form. We are told that of course nothing will be done in the way of warlike acts without the assent of Congress. If that is true, let us say so in the covenant. But as it stands there is no doubt whatever in my mind that American troops and American ships may be ordered to any part of the world by nations other than the United States, and that is a proposition to which I for one can never assent. It must be made perfectly clear that no American soldiers, not even a corporal's guard, that no American sailors, not even the crew of a submarine, can ever be engaged in war or ordered anywhere except by the constitutional authorities of the United States. To Congress is granted by the Constitution the right to declare war, and nothing that would take the troops out of the country at the bidding or demand of other nations should ever be permitted except through congressional action. The lives of Americans must never be sacrificed except by the will of the American people expressed through their chosen Representatives in Congress. This is a point upon which no doubt can be permitted. American soldiers and American sailors have never failed the country when the country called upon them. They went in their hundreds of thousands into the war just closed. They went to die for the great cause of freedom and of civilization. They went at their country's bidding and because their country summoned them to service. We were late in entering the war. We made no preparation, as we ought to have done, for the ordeal which was clearly coming upon us; but we went and we turned the wavering scale. It was done by the American soldier, the American sailor, and the spirit and energy of the American people. They overrode all obstacles and all shortcomings on the part of the administration or of Congress and gave to their country a great place in the great victory. It was the first time we had been called upon to rescue the civilized world. Did we fail? On the contrary, we succeeded, we succeeded largely and nobly, and we did it without any command from any league of nations. When the emergency came we met it and we were able to meet it because we had

built up on this continent the greatest and most powerful nation in the world, built it up under our own policies, in our own way, and one great element of our strength was the fact that we had held aloof and had not thrust ourselves into European quarrels; that we had no selfish interest to serve. We made great sacrifices. We have done splendid work. I believe that we do not require to be told by foreign nations when we shall do work which freedom and civilization require. I think we can move to victory much better under our own command than under the command of others. Let us unite with the world to promote the peaceable settlement of all international disputes. Let us try to develop international law. Let us associate ourselves with the other nations for these purposes. But let us retain in our own hands and in our own control the lives of the youth of the land. Let no American be sent into battle except by the constituted authorities of his own country and by the will of the people of the United States.

Those of us, Mr. President, who are either wholly opposed to the league or who are trying to preserve the independence and the safety of the United States by changing the terms of the league and who are endeavoring to make the league, if we are to be a member of it, less certain to promote war instead of peace, have been reproached with selfishness in our outlook and with a desire to keep our country in a state of isolation. So far as the question of isolation goes, it is impossible to isolate the United States. I well remember the time, twenty years ago, when eminent Senators and other distinguished gentlemen who were opposing the Philippines and shrieking about imperialism, sneered at the statement made by some of us, that the United States had become a world power. I think no one now would question that the Spanish War marked the entrance of the United States into world affairs to a degree which had never obtained before. It was both an inevitable and an irrevocable step, and our entrance into the war with Germany certainly showed once and for all that the United States was not unmindful of its world responsibilities. We may set aside all this empty talk about isolation. Nobody expects to isolate the United States or to make it a hermit

Nation, which is a sheer absurdity. But there is a wide difference between taking a suitable part and bearing a due responsibility in world affairs and plunging the United States into every controversy and conflict on the face of the globe. By meddling in all the differences which may arise among any portion or fragment of human-kind we simply fritter away our influence and injure ourselves to no good purpose. We shall be of far more value to the world and its peace by occupying, so far as possible, the situation which we have occupied for the last twenty years and by adhering to the policy of Washington and Hamilton, of Jefferson and Monroe, under which we have risen to our present greatness and prosperity. The fact that we have been separated by our geographical situation and by our consistent policy from the broils of Europe has made us more than any one thing capable of performing the great work which we performed in the war against Germany and our disinterestedness is of far more value to the world than our eternal meddling in every possible dispute could ever be.

Now, as to our selfishness. I have no desire to boast that we are better than our neighbors, but the fact remains that this Nation in making peace with Germany had not a single selfish or individual interest to serve. All we asked was that Germany should be rendered incapable of again breaking forth, with all the horrors incident to German warfare, upon an unoffending world, and that demand was shared by every free nation and indeed by humanity itself. For ourselves we asked absolutely nothing. We have not asked any government or governments to guarantee our boundaries or our political independence. We have no fear in regard to either. We have sought no territory, no privileges, no advantages, for ourselves. That is the fact. It is apparent on the face of the treaty. I do not mean to reflect upon a single one of the powers with which we have been associated in the war against Germany, but there is not one of them which has not sought individual advantages for their own national benefit. I do not criticize their desires at all. The services and sacrifices of England and France and Belgium and Italy are beyond estimate and beyond praise. I am glad they should have what

they desire for their own welfare and safety. But they all receive under the peace territorial and commercial benefits. We are asked to give, and we in no way seek to take. Surely it is not too much to insist that when we are offered nothing but the opportunity to give and to aid others we should have the right to say what sacrifices we shall make and what the magnitude of our gifts shall be. In the prosecution of the war we gave unstintedly American lives and American treasure. When the war closed we had three million men under arms. We were turning the country into a vast workshop for war. We advanced ten billions to our allies. We refused no assistance that we could possibly render. All the great energy and power of the Republic were put at the service of the good cause. We have not been ungenerous. We have been devoted to the cause of freedom, humanity, and civilization everywhere. Now we are asked, in the making of peace, to sacrifice our sovereignty in important respects, to involve ourselves almost without limit in the affairs of other nations, and to yield up policies and rights which we have maintained throughout our history. We are asked to incur liabilities to an unlimited extent and furnish assets at the same time which no man can measure. I think it is not only our right but our duty to determine how far we shall go. Not only must we look carefully to see where we are being led into endless disputes and entanglements, but we must not forget that we have in this country millions of people of foreign birth and parentage.

Our one great object is to make all these people Americans so that we may call on them to place America first and serve America as they have done in the war just closed. We can not Americanize them if we are continually thrusting them back into the quarrels and difficulties of the countries from which they came to us. We shall fill this land with political disputes about the troubles and quarrels of other countries. We shall have a large portion of our people voting not on American questions and not on what concerns the United States but dividing on issues which concern foreign countries alone. That is an unwholesome and perilous condition to force upon this country. We must avoid it. We

ought to reduce to the lowest possible point the foreign questions in which we involve ourselves. Never forget that this league is primarily — I might say overwhelmingly — a political organization, and I object strongly to having the politics of the United States turn upon disputes where deep feeling is aroused but in which we have no direct interest. It will all tend to delay the Americanization of our great population and it is more important not only to the United States but to the peace of the world to make all these people good Americans than it is to determine that some piece of territory should belong to one European country rather than to another. For this reason I wish to limit strictly our interference in the affairs of Europe and of Africa. We have interests of our own in Asia and in the Pacific which we must guard upon our own account, but the less we undertake to play the part of umpire and thrust ourselves into European conflicts the better for the United States and for the world.

It has been reiterated here on this floor, and reiterated to the point of weariness, that in every treaty there is some sacrifice of sovereignty. That is not a universal truth by any means, but it is true of some treaties and it is a platitude which does not require reiteration. The question and the only question before us here is how much of our sovereignty we are justified in sacrificing. In what I have already said about other nations putting us into war I have covered one point of sovereignty which ought never to be yielded, the power to send American soldiers and sailors everywhere, which ought never to be taken from the American people or impaired in the slightest degree. Let us beware how we palter with our independence. We have not reached the great position from which we were able to come down into the field of battle and help to save the world from tyranny by being guided by others. Our vast power has all been built up and gathered together by ourselves alone. We forced our way upward from the days of the Revolution, through a world often hostile and always indifferent. We owe no debt to anyone except to France in that Revolution, and those policies and those rights on which our power has been founded should never be lessened or weakened. It

will be no service to the world to do so and it will be of intolerable injury to the United States. We will do our share. We are ready and anxious to help in all ways to preserve the world's peace. But we can do it best by not crippling ourselves.

I am as anxious as any human being can be to have the United States render every possible service to the civilization and the peace of mankind, but I am certain we can do it best by not putting ourselves in leading strings or subjecting our policies and our sovereignty to other nations. The independence of the United States is not only more precious to ourselves but to the world than any single possession. Look at the United States to-day. We have made mistakes in the past. We have had shortcomings. We shall make mistakes in the future and fall short of our own best hopes. But none the less is there any country to-day on the face of the earth which can compare with this in ordered liberty, in peace, and in the largest freedom? I feel that I can say this without being accused of undue boastfulness, for it is the simple fact, and in making this treaty and taking on these obligations all that we do is in a spirit of unselfishness and in a desire for the good of mankind. But it is well to remember that we are dealing with nations every one of which has a direct individual interest to serve, and there is grave danger in an unshared idealism. Contrast the United States with any country on the face of the earth to-day and ask yourself whether the situation of the United States is not the best to be found. I will go as far as anyone in world service, but the first step to world service is the maintenance of the United States. You may call me selfish if you will, conservative or reactionary, or use any other harsh adjective you see fit to apply, but an American I was born, an American I have remained all my life. I can never be anything else but an American, and I must think of the United States first, and when I think of the United States first in an arrangement like this I am thinking of what is best for the world, for if the United States fails the best hopes of mankind fail with it. I have never had but one allegiance — I can not divide it now. I have loved but one flag and I can not share that devotion and give affection to the

mongrel banner invented for a league. Internationalism, illustrated by the Bolshevik and by the men to whom all countries are alike provided they can make money out of them, is to me repulsive. National I must remain, and in that way I, like all other Americans, can render the amplest service to the world. The United States is the world's best hope, but if you fetter her in the interests and quarrels of other nations, if you tangle her in the intrigues of Europe, you will destroy her power for good and endanger her very existence. Leave her to march freely through the centuries to come as in the years that have gone. Strong, generous and confident, she has nobly served mankind. Beware how you trifle with your marvelous inheritance, this great land of ordered liberty, for if we stumble and fall, freedom and civilization everywhere will go down in ruin.

We are told that we shall "break the heart of the world" if we do not take this league just as it stands. I fear that the hearts of the vast majority of mankind would beat on strongly and steadily and without any quickening if the league were to perish altogether. If it should be effectively and beneficently changed the people who would lie awake in sorrow for a single night could be easily gathered in one not very large room, but those who would draw a long breath of relief would reach to millions.

We hear much of visions and I trust we shall continue to have visions and dream dreams of a fairer future for the race. But visions are one thing and visionaries are another, and the mechanical appliances of the rhetorician designed to give a picture of a present which does not exist and of a future which no man can predict are as unreal and shortlived as the steam or canvas clouds, the angels suspended on wires, and the artificial lights of the stage. They pass with the moment of effect and are shabby and tawdry in the daylight. Let us at least be real. Washington's entire honesty of mind and his fearless look into the face of all facts are qualities which can never go out of fashion and which we should all do well to imitate.

Ideals have been thrust upon us as an argument for the league until the healthy mind, which rejects cant, revolts from them. Are ideals confined to this deformed

experiment upon a noble purpose, tainted as it is with bargains, and tied to a peace treaty which might have been disposed of long ago to the great benefit of the world if it had not been compelled to carry this rider on its back? "Post equitem sedet atra cura," Horace tells us, but no blacker care ever sat behind any rider than we shall find in this covenant of doubtful and disputed interpretation as it now perches upon the treaty of peace.

No doubt many excellent and patriotic people see a coming fulfillment of noble ideals in the words "league for peace." We all respect and share these aspirations and desires, but some of us see no hope, but rather defeat, for them in this murky covenant. For we, too, have our ideals, even if we differ from those who have tried to establish a monopoly of idealism. Our first ideal is our country, and we see her in the future, as in the past, giving service to all her people and to the world. Our ideal of the future is that she should continue to render that service of her own free will. She has great problems of her own to solve, very grim and perilous problems, and a right solution, if we can attain to it, would largely benefit mankind. We would have our country strong to resist a peril from the West, as she has flung back the German menace from the East. We would not have our politics distracted and embittered by the dissensions of other lands. We would not have our country's vigor exhausted or her moral force abated by everlasting meddling and muddling in every quarrel, great and small, which afflicts the world. Our ideal is to make her ever stronger and better and finer, because in that way alone, as we believe, can she be of the greatest service to the world's peace and to the welfare of mankind.

SPEECH OF
HON. PHILANDER C. KNOX

SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE SENATE, AUGUST 29, 1919

I WISH at the outset to make my own position perfectly clear, that reason or excuse for misunderstanding or misinterpretation may not exist. No one more abhors Germany's lawlessness, her cruelty, her gross inhumanity in the conduct of this war than do I. No one is more determined than I to make her pay the full penalty for the great wrongs she has inflicted on civilization and on the world whose equipoise she has by her iniquities well nigh destroyed. It must not seem to be profitable for any one to violate the great eternal laws of right and we must vindicate them now against Germany if we are to save ourselves from chaos. The observations I shall make are therefore dictated by no maudlin sympathy for Germany, the felon who must suffer the penalty incident to his crime.

But I am vitally concerned in the peace of this world, and peace we must have if it be attainable. But, Mr. President, I am convinced after the most painstaking consideration that I can give, that this Treaty does not spell peace but war—war more woeful and devastating than the one we have but now closed. The instrument before us is not the Treaty but the Truce of Versailles. It is for this body—the co-ordinate treaty-making power of this great neutral nation of ours—to make of the document a peace treaty if possible, or if that be impossible then we must put this nation in such relation to the treaty and to the powers of the world that our voice may hereafter as heretofore be always raised for peace.

It is to be regretted that the whole matter has been so

unfortunately managed, that there has been so much of needless secrecy, so many times mere partial disclosure when the whole truth could and should have been told, so much of assumed mystery in the whole affair, that it has become impossible for any of us not in the confidences, to tell when we have arrived at the whole of any matter. It is no fault of mine if the facts themselves shall speak an impeachment of the wisdom, the purpose, or the result of the negotiations.

Fortunately it is no longer necessary to insist upon the high importance of this treaty, nor the fact that it marks the point in our history where we turn from our old course of proved happiness, prosperity, and safety, to a new one, for us yet untried, of alliances, balance of power, and coalition with countries and peoples whose interests, aspirations and ideals are foreign to our own, because the people are waking to this as the true issue. Little by little they are bringing a divulgence of the facts connected with the treaty and they may now hope finally to see the whole of the great gaunt tragedy into which those whom they had charged with protecting them, were about to betray them.

But as this treaty itself, as finally placed before us, is so intricate and all-embracing in its conception, is so ponderous and voluminous in its execution, is so microscopic in detail, and, because of these things, so inaccessible to the people upon whose backs it is proposed to place its mighty burdens, it has seemed due and proper that, to the extent of my power, I should add my bit to the information which other senators are so ably placing before them. For assuredly it is one of the calamities of this situation that of the hundred million of us who are to sign this great promissory note, but a paltry few thousand will be able to read it before signature. And that, Mr. President, is at once my reason and my excuse for again intruding my voice in this discussion, for it is the duty of each of us who are charged with the responsibility of speaking and acting for the people in this matter, to give to them, in as concrete and understandable a form as we may, the actual provisions of this document. The people will judge this matter rightly if they but know and understand its facts.

But unfortunately this treaty, intricate, ponderous and

voluminous as it is, yet is by no means the whole story. Many documents involved in its making, are before neither the senate nor the people.

Within the last week, the committee on foreign relations requested that the proceedings of the peace conference and the documents connected therewith should be furnished for our information. The reply was that all were not here, only those immediately at hand having been brought, and that those here were being sorted and some would be finally sent. Why should these documents need sorting? Do they hold secrets it is thought best the American people should not know?

Nor have we yet the treaties with Germany's allies,—the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bulgaria, and Turkey,—all of whom if we may credit report are to be dismembered or shorn of territory, or both. The provisions of the treaty before us are intimately and inevitably entwined with those of these other treaties. Can we wisely proceed without those treaties and treat this situation piecemeal?

If the negotiators found it necessary, as they did, to consider the whole situation at one time that they might arrive at harmonious arrangements, must not we also to act intelligently and wisely have everything before us?

What is it, sir, about these things that the people cannot know? What is there to hide from them? Must we take this thing, as the German people must take it, unsight and unseen? Are we to be no more advantaged than our fallen enemies? We are asking neither for a Saar basin, a Fiume, nor a Shantung. We have no hope or desire of aggrandizement to be disappointed. We want merely to know what we are promising to do.

Mr. President, a treaty of peace has two great functions: In the first place it ends the war and brings back peace; and in the next place it gives to the victor his spoils, which normally take the form of territorial adjustments and monetary or other indemnity, either merely to make good his losses, or in addition to impose a penalty. If the victor be guided by a wise statesmanship he so accommodates his spoils as not to sow seeds for another conflict with his erstwhile enemy. The great war now ending was bottomed on Bismarck's violation of this fundamental principle. France overlooked her

indemnity, but she never forgot or forgave Alsace-Lorraine. There is, I warn you, senators, many another Alsace-Lorraine in the treaty laid before us for action.

The first of the named functions of a peace treaty is performed in this case not by an article specifically declaring that the treaty brings peace to the parties belligerent, but by two widely separated clauses, one at the very beginning of the document and another at the very end of it, from which you spell out the time and occasion of the termination of this conflict. The initial clause which follows the recitation of the persons signing, says:

“From the coming into force of the present Treaty the state of war will terminate. From that moment and subject to the provisions of this Treaty official relations with Germany, and with any of the German states, will be resumed by the Allied and Associated Powers.”

In the last article, the fourth and third clauses preceding the testimonial clause read as follows:

“A first procès verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand. . . .

“From the date of this first procès verbal the Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it. For the determination of all periods of time provided for in the present Treaty this date will be the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.”

Germany and Great Britain have already ratified the treaty. So soon, therefore, as the treaty has been ratified by any two of the remaining principal allied and associated powers, the remaining powers being the United States, France, Italy, and Japan, and when the procès-verbal of such deposit of ratifications has been drawn up, “the state of war will terminate,” as a reading of the many treaty clauses, coming into force at that time and making the further conduct of the war impossible, will clearly show.

It results from the foregoing, that in order to bring peace between us and Germany it is not necessary that we shall ratify this treaty. It is true Congress need not accept this treaty termination of our belligerency, and might by proper resolution, either joint, concurrent, or by separate resolution to the same effect by the senate and house respectively, con-

tinue this war, because to Congress exclusively belongs the authority to create a status of war, and therefore it might continue such a status by a new declaration. But Congress has no desire to do and will not do this thing.

On the other hand, Congress, while it cannot negotiate a peace with the enemy, can nevertheless end hostilities with him by declaring, as no longer existent, the status of war with him, which the Congress created by its own act.

Thus so soon as the first procès-verbal is drawn under this treaty, Congress may, with all propriety, and should to ensure full legality to the act of the executive in negotiating this particular treaty provision, pass a resolution — concurrent, because the executive having already committed himself to the substance thereof, his approval would be superfluous — which shall declare that the status of war created by its resolution of April 6, 1917, no longer exists and that a status of peace from that moment obtains. Thus we shall put the country immediately upon a complete peace basis and may at once resume all our normal commercial and other relations with Germany, unhampered by any restrictions. So much for that part of the treaty which ends the war.

I pass now to the second branch of the treaty, which comprises its whole volume aside from the brief clauses I have quoted, and which deals with the victor's spoils.

In order that we may better appraise the value of the provisions to which I shall call your attention, it seems well that we recall the bearings of the course we laid for ourselves when we entered this war, when we literally pledged the lives of our own sons to the accomplishment of a purpose stated, — a pledge redeemed in full necessary measure as the mourning in fifty thousand homes bears witness. To refresh our recollection of a few salient facts, I shall in the first place read the words of President Wilson when he invited Congress to declare war. Said he, after adverting to the course of the Imperial German government in submarine warfare, "I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the *Imperial German Government* to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of de-

fense, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the *Government of the German Empire* to terms and end the war."

A little later in the same address he said: "We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering the war. It was not with their previous knowledge and approval." Still further on, asserting that Prussian autocracy "has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of Government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce," he said, "we knew that their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us (who were no doubt as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing." Again still later, "we are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy." And finally he said: "It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with a desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible Government which has thrown aside all consideration of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early re-establishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us."

Or to put it shortly our purposes as stated by Mr. Wilson were threefold,—first, the defeat and elimination of the Imperial German government and Prussian autocracy; next, the liberation from their yoke of despotism of the German people themselves (for whom we had nothing but sympathy and friendship) to the end that they might be masters of their own fates and fortunes; and lastly the re-establishment,

as sincere friends of the German people, "of intimate relations of mutual advantage between them and us."

But we here in Congress were not quite so sure-footed in our estimate of our relations to the German people in case we went to war. It became difficult for us to work out just how we could confine our hostility to the Imperial German government when the German people and not the German royalty were to shoot down our sons, and while we were bending all our efforts to kill the German people. But we did see this in the situation,—our own citizens of German ancestry were among our best, most stalwart and freedom-loving, patriotic citizens, whose ancestors in many cases had fled Germany to escape the despotism against which we were about to wage war. We recalled that the Teutonic peoples were in origin and early tradition a free people who knew no masters. And we judged that rid of those rulers who had debauched their intellects for generations, this mighty people would reassert their racial characteristics as had their sons who had come to us, and that they would become in turn a great, free people, as they had been a great monarchical nation. And this is my faith to-day, if we but give that great people a fair chance, consistent with the punishment they have earned and must suffer.

But no one here was such an ecstatic as to conceive that, going forward, we should not make war on the German people, or that before the war should end we should not have engendered hostility towards them. Congress, therefore, on April 6, four days after the delivery of the President's address, declared, in a joint resolution, the existence of a state of war between the United States and the Imperial German government, solemnly affirmed that the Imperial government had so "committed repeated acts of war against the Government and people of the United States" that a state of war has been thrust upon them by that government, and therefore formally pledged the whole military and national resources of the country "to bring the conflict to a successful termination."

These were the aims, the purposes, and the reasons for entry into the conflict as stated in our former record. How mighty was the accord of our whole people therein was shown by their full and quick approval of the measures Congress took to make good the pledge we gave,—the

passing of the Selective Service Act and of the measures imposing our enormous financial powers and obligations.

These were the ends and the purposes which threw into the conflict with their whole hearts and souls, our great, splendid body of loyal citizens of German ancestry. Fired with the spirit of liberty and freedom and weighted with the blessings of free government, they saw in the war an opportunity to bring to the home folk in the old fatherland, the same inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Their sons rushed to our standards, to fight first that we might continue to live free, and next that liberty and its blessings might come to their kindred across the sea.

We did have, we had to have a quarrel with the German people; it was inevitable that we should entertain towards them hostile feelings. But we had and have a sympathy for them as misguided and misdirected, and we did hope that, winning the war, we should liberate them from an intellectual despotism they seemed not to sense, and that thereafter they would arise a free great people.

So we entered the war. Eighteen months later, Germany, staggering, asked for an armistice to arrange a peace. Before the armistice was granted, the Emperor and the Crown Prince fled their dominions, followed by certain of their military chieftains. Next came the abdication of the Emperor, and the initiation of proceedings looking to the democratization of Germany.

Thus, *prima facie*, we had achieved the full purpose for which we entered the war; our enemy was defeated, the Imperial government destroyed, and the German people were liberated, free,—again quoting the President,—to “choose their way of life and of obedience.”

Following this came the signing of the armistice of November 11, the terms of which wisely and properly put it beyond the power of Germany thereafter effectively to continue this war.

There we, who sought no territory, nor indemnity, nor aggrandized power, should have rested, signed our peace when our associates made peace, and quit the war as we entered it, still free and independent, masters of our own destiny, able to work for the benefit of all mankind, unhampered by entangling alliances or commitments.

We should have left the political adjustments and the indemnities to the powers of Europe who alone were immediately concerned, we at most exercising a restraining hand to see, first, that justice was done to a fallen foe—and this in spite of the fact that he initiated and carried out the most cruel, relentless, inhuman war of modern times—and in the next place to ensure that no more dragon's teeth were sown in Europe than the indispensable necessities imperatively required. Such a course would neither have endangered nor sacrificed those threatened peoples to whose assistance we came, for Germany had been disarmed, and our two millions of young men, now for the first time fairly equipped, were still in France at the behest of any military exigency which might arise.

But such was not the course followed, and our representatives sat at the peace table as co-equal negotiators.

Twenty-seven powers (besides Germany) have signed this treaty. Five of these,—the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan are designated as the principal allied and associated powers. These five with the other twenty-two signing the treaty (besides Germany) are termed the allied and associated powers. Of these twenty-two, four only were European powers in existence at the outbreak of the war—namely, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, and Roumania; three others of Europe are created or recognized by the treaty—Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the boundaries of which nor its location the treaty does not disclose. Of the remaining fifteen states, three are Asiatic,—Siam, China—who has the sole distinction of being robbed by her allies—and the Hedjaz—likewise with undefined boundaries and, as to the treaty, unlocated. The eleven remaining states are of Latin America as follows: Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. I have mentioned these twenty-two states so we may have clearly in mind the fact that all of them combined could not under the most favorable conditions one could hope for, withstand the armies of Germany one day, or enforce against Germany's will the most inoffensive treaty stipulation. In the domain of force, in which Germany has lived and will continue for a time to live, these powers count for naught. The great responsibilities of the

treaty, the only power behind the treaty, is that of the five principal allied and associated powers. Nor does the treaty in any of its parts blink this. There is no single important function in the treaty, performable by the victor powers, which is not consigned to the five great powers. There is no single important immediate function consigned to the league of nations, which does not run to the council of the league which these five powers control and of which they are the sanctioning force. The small powers are named that may be granted benefits. The load of the world, the keeping of the peace of the world, under this treaty rests on the five powers.

But there is one power we miss in all this, the power which met the brunt of the German shock while the rest of the world got ready; the power that mobilized in the allied cause some twenty-one million men; that lost—killed in action—two and a half millions; that lost in other casualties three and a half millions of whom one and a half million are absolute invalids and badly mutilated; that lost in prisoners two millions, of whom half died in prison; a power whose armies at the beginning of February in 1917 numbered fourteen million men under arms; who fought during the war over a front of thirty-five hundred miles, and who had there pitted against her one-third of the whole German Army, two-thirds of the whole Austrian Army, all of the Hungarian Army, and two-thirds of the whole Turkish Army; a power who took as prisoners of war four hundred thousand Germans, three hundred thousand Hungarians, three hundred thousand Turks, and one million Austrians. I speak of poor, ever despot-ridden Russia. I have but said China enjoyed a unique position, but I spoke in haste. Russia, who raised three times as many men as we planned to raise as a maximum; Russia whose losses if imposed on us would have made every home in this land a house of mourning; Russia whose men in battle front, unarmed and unequipped, stopped the German onrush of cold steel with bare breasts and clenched fists, so saving us and Europe from slavery; Russia whose people and rulers stood forefront, our friends, even in the hours of our sore and most threatening distress, this Russia, with this record, is mentioned in this treaty but only with ominous words that presage her national destruction.

Russia, sir, is a problem, but dismemberment by others is not its solution. And shall I tell you, Mr. President, what the intelligent Russians, those of the great so-called middle classes, are saying? It is this,—we must first recover ourselves and wipe out the dishonor of our collapse, the dishonor of forsaking our allies in the hour of their dire need. And then we must readjust our dominions as we wish them, for Russia can never be bound by the Russia-disposing portions of a treaty to which Russia is not a party. And I ask you, sir, would we?

And this thought brings me to speak again of what I have said heretofore, that this treaty, stripped of its meaningless beatific provisions, provides merely and simply for an alliance between the five great powers in a coalition against the balance of the world. And again I ask, has history ever answered this save in one way—by destroying the coalition and at times all or some of its constituent members.

Think you Germany—smarting and staggering under the terms of this, the hardest treaty of modern times—will, even if we were to set up the league and she should join it, supinely rest content with the dole of grace and sufferance we are vouchsafing her, the crumbs from her victors' table? It is beside the point to say that such is but her just deserts and the full measure thereof. Lacking the wisdom to go forward and inflict a military punishment that would have uprooted their philosophy of force and taught them the lesson of live and let live, we have left them, beaten, but proud and arrogant, with their mighty spirit bent for the time but unbroken, with their damning philosophy unchanged, and with a will, fired by hate, to mete out revenge.

That people will no more cease to plot and plan to recover their former high estate, than did Satan plunged into the abysmal depths of Hell. Whether they are in the league if formed or out of it, Germany's agents, secretly or openly, will be at work with her former allies, and with injured Russia, and with Japan—whose conceptions, ideals, aspirations, and ambitions are of Imperial Germany, not democratic America, Britain, and France. As Russia goes, so will go the whole Slavic and affiliated peoples. And if Germany succeed in this and be able to unite these

powers to herself, to turn the teeming millions of Russia to swell her own ranks, and to augment this by the great yellow races of the Pacific who through Russia would have unimpeded access to the battle front, western Europe, at least, must perish. Think you, Germany, revengeful, will turn aside from so imposing and grateful a vision in order to grace for generations a conqueror's triumph?

Why have we invited this vision? Was there none at all of that much vaunted forward-looking at the peace table? The wise, the obviously wise course required not months of inventing and piling up penalties, but a few hours devoted to a plan that should rid Germany of the Hohenzollerns, that should provide for her democratization, that should impose a lesson-bearing indemnity, and that should then bind with rivets of steel, because rivets of friendship, the German people to Western Europe, to France, who cannot hope to keep Germany under her feet. Napoleon tried to conquer a people and failed, — this should be France's lesson. The only possible wise course for France, her only permanent safety, is closest friendship with Germany. The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, the payment of a suitable indemnity, and then forgetfulness as to the past, hard as that might prove, — this should have sufficed. It may seem I am unsympathic, unmindful and forgetful of wrongs and injuries, unmoved by suffering and grief. I am none of these. I am trying to point out how France herself might escape further and more overwhelming wrong, suffering, and grief. For as certain as the sun rises, if we follow the road in which this treaty sets our feet, France and ourselves shall meet those on the way.

The treaty of peace is divided into fifteen parts. All of them deal with territorial adjustments, penalties, and indemnities of the war, except Part I (containing the Covenant of the League of Nations) and Part XIII, Labor (providing for an international labor organization). The other parts are in their order, — Part II, Boundaries of Germany; Part III, Political Clauses for Europe; Part IV, German rights and interests outside Germany; Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses; Part VI, Prisoners of War and Graves; Part VII, Penalties; Part VIII, Reparation; Part IX, Financial Clauses; Part X, Economic Clauses; Part XI, Aerial Navigation; Part XII, Ports, Waterways, and Rail-

ways; Part XIV, Guaranties; and Part XV, Miscellaneous Provisions.

It is, of course, impossible to give even a detailed summary of a volume of some eighty thousand odd words, doubtless the longest treaty in history. But I shall also aim to give a picture of certain general features to which I wish to invite special attention.

By this treaty Germany cedes outright portions of her European territory to Belgium, to France (a recession of Alsace-Lorraine), to Poland, to the Czecho-Slovak State, and to the principal allied and associated powers, — including the United States, — who get unconditionally Memel (a small strip of territory in the extreme northeastern tip of Germany) and the free city of Danzig with its adjacent territory, to be placed under the protection of the league of nations. Germany also cedes, contingent upon the wishes of the people in the area affected, as expressed by a vote, further portions of her territory to Belgium, to Poland, and to the allied and associated powers, who thus take Schleswig with an obligation at some time to hand it over to Denmark, if the people so vote. The Czecho-Slovak state secures a further bit of territory if a determination of the Polish frontier should isolate it from Germany; and the league of nations takes as trustee the Saar basin, which shall be governed, however, by a commission appointed, not by the league, but by the council of the league, pending the plebiscite of fifteen years hence. Thus the United States becomes the owner in fee of a tenant in common of European territory, and a trustee as to other territory.

For this territory so ceded nobody pays Germany anything, nor is any credit allowed Germany for it on her reparation account, to which I shall shortly refer. However, all cessionary powers, except France and the league of nations as to the Saar basin, assume that portion of the imperial and state debt attaching to the ceded area — fixed, stated roughly, upon the basis of the pre-war revenue of the area to the pre-war total imperial and state revenue respectively.

The imperial and state property in all these areas, including the private property of the former German Emperor and other royal personages, is turned over to the cessionary of the area who must pay the value of the same to the repa-

ration commission which places the same to the credit of Germany on the reparation account. This does not apply to France, who takes such property in Alsace-Lorraine without payment, nor to Belgium, nor to the Saar basin.

Germany cedes all her overseas possessions in fee simple to the allied and associated powers, who do not assume the debts and who take all the property, without any compensation whatever running to Germany either for the territory ceded or for the actual property taken. Thus the United States becomes a tenant in common with the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, of Germany's African possessions comprising Togo, Kamerun, German Southwest Africa, and German East Africa, with an area of nearly one million square miles (almost one-third the size of the United States) and a native population of about eleven and a half millions; of her Pacific possessions, including Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, Bismarck's Archipelago, Caroline Islands, Palau or Pelew Islands, Marianne Islands, Solomon Islands, and Marshall Islands. It may be noted in passing that certain of these island possessions form a barrier ring to access to the Philippines, and their possession by any power other than ourselves is big with potential troubles for us.

Germany cedes also without compensation of any sort or description her extraterritorial and analogous rights in Siam, Morocco, Egypt, and Samoa, and recognizes the French protectorate in Morocco and the British protectorate in Egypt. The imperial and state property in these areas go to the cessionaries without compensation. The same is true of such property located in and ceded to China. Germany's rights in Shantung and German property also are ceded to Japan "free and clear of all charges and encumbrances."

Thus territorially Germany has been closed out in all the world without a penny's compensation. Moreover, she loses the efforts of a generation to provide an outlet for her rapidly increasing surplus population which now must and will find expanding room elsewhere. To this situation is added a restriction of Germany's European area which would have taken care of a part of this expansion.

The indemnities provided by the treaty may be classed roughly into two divisions: (1) restitution in case of cash taken away, seized, or sequestered, and also restitution of

animals, objects of every nature and securities taken away, seized, or sequestrated in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them in territory belonging to Germany or to her allies; and (2) reparation for all the damage done to the civilian population of the allied and associated powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an allied or associated power against Germany by her aggression by land, by sea, and from the air, and this includes damages inflicted not only by Germany but by Germany's allies, and also by the allied and associated powers themselves upon their own nationals.

There can of course be no question as to the propriety of compelling Germany to disgorge the loot which she seized and which she still has, nor in requiring her to replace that which she seized and has since consumed or otherwise used or destroyed. No matter what this may mean to Germany, no matter how it may leave her, this must be done. The thief must not be heard to plead necessity for the article he stole, nor inconvenience from restoring it. This is the most elemental justice and the wholesomest morality. Thus far we move on solid ground.

But when we get away from and go beyond this it behooves us to proceed with care, lest we go beyond the bounds of wise statesmanship, and in the homely adage, kill the goose that we expect to lay the golden eggs.

But the treaty edges in on the perfectly proper theory of *restitution*, by a theory designated as *replacement*, which places Germany under rather startling obligations. She is first made to "recognize (s) the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the *replacement* ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for class of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war"; she then acknowledges "that the tonnage of German shipping at present in existence is much less than that lost by the Allied and Associated Powers in consequence of the German aggression" and agrees that "the right thus recognized will be enforced on German ships and boats under the following conditions";—Germany cedes to the allied and associated powers on behalf of herself and of all other parties interested *all* German merchant ships which are of sixteen hundred tons gross and upwards. Included in these will doubtless be the thirty-two auxiliary cruisers and fleet aux-

iliary (named in another part of the treaty) which are to be disarmed and treated as merchant ships. In addition to the foregoing, Germany further cedes *one-half* reckoned in tonnage, of the ships which are between one thousand tons and sixteen hundred tons gross; *one-quarter* reckoned in tonnage of the steam trawlers; and *one-quarter* reckoned in tonnage, of the other fishing boats. All the foregoing must be delivered to the reparation commission within two months of the coming into force of the present treaty.

Thus we take practically all of Germany's means of conducting commerce through her own vessels with overseas countries, of whom we are the farthest away and of which we shall stand most in need, for it is an open secret that before the war the German shipping was the peer at least of any shipping in the world.

But the treaty goes further than this and compels Germany to lay down in her own shipyards a maximum of two hundred thousand tons of shipping for each of the next five years, — approximately half, I am told, of her ship-building capacity, — and our representatives, the reparation commission, determine the specifications, conditions of building, price to be paid — by giving credit against the reparation bill the commission will make up — and all other questions relating to the accounting, building, and delivery of the ships.

Thus for a number of years at least we have pretty effectively barred German vessels from the seas.

But this is only half the story. She is also in good part stripped of her inland shipping, for by this treaty she very properly undertakes to restore in kind and in normal condition of upkeep to the allied and associated powers, any boats and other moveable appliances belonging to inland navigation which since August 1, 1914, have by *any means whatever* come into her possession or into the possession of her nationals, and which can be identified. This would of course cover boats purchased by Germans for full value, transactions that might have been carried out through neutrals.

Nor is this all. With a view to making good the loss of the allied and associated powers in inland navigation tonnage which cannot be made good by the restitution already recited, Germany agrees to cede to the reparation commis-

sion a portion of her river fleet up to the amount of the loss mentioned, to a maximum extent of twenty per cent of the river fleet as it existed November 11, 1918.

As to all the foregoing ocean-going and inland navigation vessels Germany agrees to take any measures indicated to her by the reparation commission for obtaining the full title to the property in *all ships* which have during the war been transferred, or are in process of transfer, to neutral flags, without the consent of the allied and associated governments.

Nor is this all. She waives all claims against the allied or associated powers for the detention, employment, loss, or damage of any German ships, except as called for by the armistice agreement; all claims to vessels or cargoes sunk by naval action, and subsequently salvaged, in which the nationals of the allied and associated powers or the powers themselves may be interested either as owners, charterers, insurers, or otherwise, notwithstanding any decree of condemnation which may have been made by a prize court of Germany or her allies.

But I am compelled to note still further shipping deliveries. The treaty obliges Germany to cede to France tugs and vessels from among those remaining registered in German Rhine ports (after the above deductions) to an amount fixed, not by the treaty even in maximum, but by an arbitrator appointed by the United States. The tugs and vessels so taken must have with them their fittings and gear, shall be in a good state of repair to carry on traffic, and shall be selected from among those most recently built.

Similarly and under like conditions, tugs and vessels to an unnamed amount must be transferred to the allied and associated powers from those used on the river systems of the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and the Danube; and in addition Germany must cede material of all kinds necessary for the utilization of these river systems by the allied and associated powers concerned.

France also gets all installations, berthing and anchorage accommodations, platforms, docks, warehouses, plants, etc., which German subjects or German companies owned on August 1, 1914, in Rotterdam, and the shares or interests possessed by such nationals or companies therein.

Thus seemingly under a theory of replacement the treaty likewise strips Germany of much of her inland shipping.

The effect of all this upon Germany's future and upon her ability to meet the other requirements of this treaty are well worthy of deep and mature reflection.

But drastic and possibly ruinous as all this is, it yet is but the beginning.

The next inroad on the doctrine of restitution is made under the name of *physical restoration*. Germany undertakes to devote her economic resources directly to the *physical restoration* of the invaded areas of the allied and associated powers to the extent that these powers may determine. Under this provision the allied and associated governments may list the animals, machinery, equipment, tools, and like articles of a commercial character, which have been seized, consumed, or destroyed by Germany or destroyed in direct consequence of military operations—this would include military operations by the allied and associated powers themselves—which such powers urgently and immediately need and which they desire to have replaced by animals and articles of the same nature, in being in Germany at the coming into force of this treaty. As an immediate advance of animals on this account, Germany must within three months deliver to France 30,500 horses, 92,000 cattle, 101,000 sheep, and 10,000 goats; and to Belgium 10,200 horses, 92,000 cattle, 20,200 sheep, and 15,000 sows. As to such animals, machinery, equipment, tools, and like articles of a commercial character, the reparation commission in deciding the amount which shall ultimately be given by Germany must take into consideration Germany's needs, having in mind the maintenance of Germany's social and economic life and the general interest of the allied and associated powers that the industrial life of Germany shall not be so impaired as adversely to affect Germany's ability to perform the other acts of reparation called for. It is, however, provided that of machinery, tools, equipment, and like commercial articles a maximum of thirty per cent may be taken of the quantity actually in use in any one establishment.

Similar lists, subject to the same regulations may be made by the allied and associated powers of *reconstruction*

materials (stones, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, wood, window glass, steel, lime, cement, etc.), machinery, heating apparatus, and like commercial articles which the powers may desire to have produced in Germany.

In addition to the foregoing and of like character is the obligation of Germany to furnish coal to France at France's option, up to a maximum of twenty million tons for each of the first five years and eight million tons for any one of the succeeding five years; to Belgium, at her option, eight million tons per year for ten years; to Italy, at her option, amounts beginning at four and a half million tons for the first year and increasing to eight and a half million tons for the last six years; and to Luxembourg, her annual pre-war supply, if the reparation commission so directs; — a possible total of thirty-two to thirty-five millions of tons for the first five years and of twenty-five million tons for the next five years. At the option of the vendees, metallurgical coke instead of coal must be delivered at fixed ratios. In this category also is to be placed the German obligation to deliver to France for the next three successive years some one hundred and fifteen thousand tons of coal distillation products, and to the reparation commission fifty per cent of the total dyestuffs and chemical drugs in Germany or under German control at the date of the coming into force of the present treaty.

In considering the question of supplying coal we must not lose sight of the cession of the Saar basin coal mines to France.

But we come now to an item which is not to be accounted for as restitution, as replacement, or physical restoration. I refer to the cession by Germany on her own behalf and behalf of her nationals of her submarine cables. By this act the treaty takes from Germany all direct telegraph relations with overseas countries.

As a final entry under this general head I wish to observe that speaking generally, Germany also cedes to the states which secure portions of her territory, all railways situated therein; and I find in the treaty no positive provision for the payment therefor by any one. This cession carries with it the works and installations; the rolling stock, complete where a ceded road has its own stock, in a normal state of upkeep, and where a ceded road has no rolling

stock of its own, then rolling stock from German lines with which the ceded portion forms a system; and stocks of stores, fittings, and plants. And while on this point I may add that Germany must build for Czecho-Slovakia a designated railroad if that state so elects, at the latter's cost, and must build for Belgium the German portion of a deep draught Rhine-Meuse navigable waterway at her own cost (seemingly) if Belgium decides the canal should be built.

Now as to the bill against Germany,—

Germany is made to admit as a basis of her liability, the responsibility *for herself, and for all her allies*, for causing all the loss and damage to which the allied and associated governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war.

The allied and associated powers, recognizing the burden thus stated is too heavy for German resources to bear "after taking into account permanent diminution of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present treaty," require, and she so undertakes, that Germany make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the allied and associated powers and to their property during the period of belligerency of each as an allied or associated power, by land, by sea, and by air.

The reparation commission is to find one bill against Germany for this damage, the elements of which are of such importance that I feel I ought to cover them in some detail. They are as follows: 1. Damage to injured persons and to surviving dependents by personal injury to or death of civilians *caused by acts of war* including all attacks on land, on sea, or in the air, and all the direct consequences thereof, and of all operations of war by the two groups of belligerents wherever arising. 2. Damage to civilian persons, caused by Germany or her allies, by acts of cruelty, violence, or maltreatment (including injuries to life or health as a consequence of imprisonment, deportation, internment, or evacuation, of exposure at sea or of being forced to labor) wherever arising and to the surviving dependents of such victims. 3. Damage to civilian persons injured either in German territory or invaded territory, caused by Germany or her allies by acts injurious to health or capacity to work

or to honor, as well as to their surviving dependents. 4. Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment of prisoners of war. 5. As damages, the pensions and compensations in the nature of pensions to naval and military (including members of the air force) victims whether mutilated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the dependents of such victims, sums so due to be capitalized on the basis of the French scale in force on the coming into effect of the present treaty. 6. The cost of assistance extended to prisoners of war and their families. 7. Allowances by the governments of the allies and associated powers to the families and dependents of mobilized persons or persons serving in the forces, the sum to be paid to be capitalized on the basis of the French scale in force during the year the payment was made. 8. Damage to civilians by being forced by Germany or her allies to work without just remuneration. 9. Damage to all property, wherever situated belonging to any of the allied or associated states or their nationals, with the exception of naval or military works or materials, which has been carried off, seized, injured or destroyed by the acts of Germany or her allies on land, on sea or from the air, or damages directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war. 10. Damages in the form of levies, fines, and other similar exactions imposed by Germany or her allies upon the civil population.

It is admitted that certain of these damage rules violate the principles of international law as hitherto recognized and observed by the family of nations. The reason why we as well as the enemy should discard such benign principles as have been worked out by the nations in the last centuries is not clear.

The thought has been entertained that the treaty fixes, at least tentatively, the German indemnity under these rules at one hundred and twenty billion gold marks,—about twenty-four billion dollars,—but such an idea is not justified.

In the first place Germany agrees, in addition to the sum named, to pay Belgium's debt to the allies and associated powers, whatever the debt may be. This payment is to be considered restoration.

In the next place, the treaty stipulates that the twenty-four billion dollars' worth of gold bonds which Germany

undertakes to issue, is to cover "whatever part of the full amount of the approved claims *is not paid in gold, or in ships, securities, and commodities or otherwise.*" Thus the total values of all the materials to be turned over as heretofore mentioned, seem quite clearly to be in addition to this twenty-four billions of gold bonds.

Moreover, it is provided that "further issues (of bonds) by way of acknowledgment and security may be required as the (reparation) Commission subsequently determined from time to time."

So that the bill against Germany will clearly not stop at twenty-four billion dollars and may run to any amount.

I may here also correct another impression that has gone out, namely, that somehow the reparation commission can reduce the amounts to be paid by Germany if they decide such a course is wise and just. Now the reparation commission is made up of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, who always sit at its sessions and the representatives of one other power, either Belgium, Japan, or the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. While each other allied and associated power may have a representative present when its interests are involved, such representative may not vote. This commission decides the amount of the claims against Germany by a majority vote, that is to say the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy, or Belgium, or Japan, or the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, —any three of them, —may fix the amount of this indemnity. But a decision to cancel the whole or any part of the German debt or obligation requires a unanimous vote of all of them sitting and before this decision can become operative the commission must have the specific authority of the several governments represented on the commission. In other words, unless the four great powers and Belgium or Japan, or the Serb-Croat-Slovene state unanimously so agree, the claims once fixed by a majority of the commission cannot be abated one penny, except by the consent of all the powers represented on the commission. Moreover, the commission is closely limited even as to the postponement of total or partial reparation payments, for all such postponements beyond 1930 of payments falling due between May 1, 1921, and the end of 1926, and of any post-

ponement, for more than three years, of any installment falling due after 1926, requires a unanimous vote.

Assuming for the sake of the argument that some one of the powers represented on the commission is determined to exact the pound of flesh, there is no way under this treaty to prevent it, short of the application of coercive measures. The reparation commission is not and is not intended to be a beneficent philanthropic or eleemosynary institution; it is and must be the enforcer of stern retribution, imposing on the vanquished the utmost burden his back will bear.

But these measures are by no means the end of the story. Reference has already been made to the payment by Germany in securities, of what I shall designate as her non-bond debt. On this point I quote from the treaty: "Germany will within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, deliver to each Allied and Associated Power all securities, certificates, deeds, or other documents of title held by its nationals and relating to property, rights or interests situated in the territory of that Allied or Associated Power, including any shares, stock, debentures, debenture stock or other obligations of any Company incorporated in accordance with the laws of that power." That is to say, German investments in allied or associated countries and held in Germany are to be wholly closed out.

Moreover, all other property held by Germans or German companies in allied or associated countries, or territories, colonies, possessions, and protectorates may be retained or liquidated by such powers. This completes the closing out of German interests in allied and associated countries. Nor is this all, for this last provision applies to territories ceded to the allied and associated powers by this treaty, so that Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, the free city of Danzig, the principal allied and associated powers in Memel, Denmark, Belgium, and France may sell out property and interest of every German national or company within their newly acquired territory.

Furthermore, the reparation commission may require, by a majority vote, the German government to acquire and turn over to it the rights and interests of German nationals in any public utility or concession operating in Russia, China, Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or in the

possessions or dependencies of these states, or in any territory formerly belonging to Germany or her allies, or to be administered by a mandatory under this treaty.

Nor is this the end. Germany must fully compensate, and most properly so—the nationals of all allied and associated powers for the losses they have suffered with reference to property located in German territory, and this includes all property acquired or in course of acquisition by the German alien property custodian, this compensation to be reduced by the actual value of any property restored to the owners.

For all property rights or interests taken by the allied and associated powers from German nationals, Germany undertakes to compensate them.

Now the disposition of the proceeds of all this German property is obviously of the utmost importance. The treaty proposes two methods, one of which is so fantastic that it is difficult to believe our wildest dreamer would, on study, care to adopt it. I shall give you the effect of a few of its salient features: If we should proceed under it, the United States would guarantee the payment of all specified debts owed by our citizens (who were solvent at the beginning of the war) to Germans. We would establish a clearing office which would take over all such debts due to our citizens from Germans and we would undertake to act as a collection agent for all such debts due from our citizens to Germans, making good any we did not collect. From the coming into force of this treaty all payments or acceptance of payments and all communications regarding the settlement of specified obligations would be absolutely prohibited between our citizens and Germans, under penalties imposed for trading with the enemy, except correspondence through our clearing office, and each government would promise to do its utmost to ferret out and report violations of the prohibitions to the others.

If an American citizen made a claim which was not allowed, he would be fined. If he contested a claim which was allowed, he would be fined. Where he and the German could not agree, the two clearing offices would settle it if they could; if they could not agree, it would go to the mixed arbitral tribunal. If, finally, a debt were held either by the clearing offices or the mixed tribunal not to be

within the specified classes, permission is graciously given to the parties to go to court.

When all such debts are liquidated any credit balance in favor of Germany goes to the reparation commission to be credited on Germany's account. That is to say, the excess proceeds of German property in the United States would go to compensate Italian or Greek or some other power's losses.

If this clearing office system be not adopted, then Germany pays directly to the allied and associated governments or their interested nationals the cash assets and the proceeds of the property, rights, and interests, in her hands belonging to them; but each of the allied and associated powers shall dispose of the proceeds of the property rights and interests and of the cash assets of German nationals in accordance with its laws and regulations. They may apply them if they wish to the payment of claims and debts held by their nationals against German nationals, including claims against the German government for acts committed by it after July 31, 1914, and before the particular power concerned entered the war against Germany. Or, and this is most remarkable, the power may use this money derived from the proceeds of property owned by German nationals to pay debts due the power's nationals from nationals of German allies. That is, we may use German money to pay a Turk's debt.

And in all of this it is well to remember that by the treaty the property rights and interests of German nationals will continue to be subject to exceptional war measures that have been or will be taken against them.

It had not been and is not my purpose to attempt a discussion of the number of provisions of this instrument which run counter to our constitutional guarantees, but I cannot forbear the observation that no one will, I apprehend, be so hardy as to contend that, peace being established, we shall continue to have power to take private property without compensation.

Under this plan also, the excess of German property over American debts will go to the reparation commission, if we retain the excess. The treaty is not clear as to any other disposition of the surplus.

Now for all this German property so disposed of, and

for which Germany assumes liability to her own nationals, no credit is given on the reparation account, save as to that part which may be ultimately turned over to the reparation commission.

One point more and I shall be done with this part of the treaty. It is stipulated that all investments wheresoever affected with the cash assets of nationals of the high contracting parties, including companies and associations in which such nationals were interested, by persons responsible for the administration of enemy properties or having control over such administration, or by order of such persons or of any authority whatsoever, shall be annulled. That is to say either the treaty annuls or we obligate ourselves to annul all investments by our alien property custodian of enemy funds. The disposition of such funds is not clear.

Thus we close out German interests in all allied and associated countries.

But we also take other commercial measures no less far reaching. The treaty terminates all multilateral treaties to which Germany is a part except those specifically named in the instrument, and all bilateral treaties and conventions between her and other powers save only those which the other powers notify their intention to revive. Thus another presumed tenet of international law passes out with this treaty.

Moreover, under this treaty the allied and associated powers acquire all the treaty and conventional rights and advantages enjoyed by Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, and such rights and advantages granted to and enjoyed by non-belligerent states or their nationals since August 1, 1914, so long as such treaties, conventions, or agreements remain in force. Thus no power having with Germany a treaty which gave to Germany a favored position, at the expense of the power, will revive such a treaty, and every power having a treaty which gives her an advantage over Germany will revive that treaty. Furthermore, if Germany shall undertake to make with any foreign country any reciprocity treaty in regard to the importation, exportation, or transit of any goods, then all favors, immunities, and privileges granted by it shall simultaneously and unconditionally and without request or compensation be

extended to all the allied and associated states. The treaty thus effectually prevents Germany from fostering her commerce by special trade agreements with other countries.

The tariff and customs provisions are equally drastic. Notwithstanding the increased costs of production throughout the world, Germany may not, for the first six months after the coming into force of this treaty, impose higher tariffs than the most favorable duties applied to imports into Germany on July 31, 1914; and for a period of thirty months thereafter the same rule shall apply to all imports covered by a designated schedule which enjoyed rates conventionalized by treaties, to which imports are added other named articles.

Furthermore, as to all duties, charges, prohibitions, and restrictions on both exports and imports, the allied and associated powers enjoy favored nation treatment. I shall make no attempt even to list the exceptional tariff privileges granted to France, to Poland, to Luxembourg, to Morocco, and to Egypt.

The nationals of allied and associated powers, resident in Germany, have as to all measures relating to occupation, professions, trade, and industry, most favored nation treatment; and as to taxes, charges, and imports, direct or indirect, touching the property, rights, or interests of nationals or companies of such powers, or restrictions, the treatment must be that accorded to German nationals. In all the foregoing I do not recall one reciprocal favor granted to Germany or her nationals.

The general principle of favored nation treatment, and in some cases national treatment, is granted to the allied and associated countries and their nationals, in all matters referring to transit, which Germany must expedite, over and through German territory, and as to all charges connected therewith, all without any reciprocal undertaking in favor of Germany. All regulations governing such traffic must be equal, and non-discriminating as against the allied or associated powers or their nationals. Moreover, all inland traffic, our "coastwise" trade, is open to the vessels of the allied and associated powers on the same terms as German vessels, while Germany may not engage without permission in the like traffic of any other power.

Existing free zones in ports shall be maintained, and in

addition Germany shall lease to Czecho-Slovakia areas in Hamburg and Stettin which shall be placed under the regime of free zones.

Certain specified areas of the great German river systems of the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and additional parts of the Danube and all navigable parts of these river systems are internationalized and placed under the administration of international commissions. The internationalization of the Rhine is extended. On these the traffic is open to the vessels of all nations on terms of perfect equality. Special concessions are given to France and Belgium on the Rhine which need not be farther noted.

Finally Germany undertakes so to adapt her railway rolling stock that it may accommodate the inclusion in German trains of the rolling stock of the allied and associated powers, and that the trains of the latter may incorporate German rolling stock. In addition to this regulations are laid down as to rates and traffic on through trains which Germany undertakes to accept and operate.

These are broad statements covering an almost infinity of details on these various subjects. For no one of these various trade concessions and agreements is Germany given any credit or compensation, nor any direct or conspicuous advantage named in the treaty.

In addition to all this, she waives all claims arising out of the internment or repatriation of German nationals, and all claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German ships or the liquidation of German property in China and Siam. Germany waives to all of the allied and associated powers and their nationals (as already noted) all claims of any description in respect to the detention, employment (except under the armistice terms), loss or damage of any German ships or boats, and all claims to vessels or cargoes sunk by or in consequence of naval action and subsequently salvaged, in which any of the allied or associated governments or their nationals may have any interest either as owner, charterer, insurer, or otherwise, notwithstanding any decree or condemnation by a German prize court. Finally Germany undertakes not to put forward directly or indirectly against any allied or associated power signatory of the present treaty, including those which without having declared war, have broken off diplomatic rela-

tions with the German Empire, any pecuniary claim based on events which occurred at any time before the coming into force of the present treaty, such claims by this provision to be finally and completely barred.

And as a capstone to this whole remarkable edifice, let me refer to that provision by which Germany on the one hand accepts and agrees to be bound by all decrees, and orders concerning German ships and goods made by any prize court of the allied and associated powers and agrees to put forward no claim arising out of such orders and decrees, and on the other hand acknowledges the right of the allied and associated powers to challenge all German prize court decisions and orders.

As to that part of the treaty which deals with labor, I shall now merely say: Either it will never be enforced as drawn, and perhaps was never intended to be enforced as drawn but to be merely a sop thrown to labor, or if enforced as written and in the spirit its provisions seem to carry, it will wreck the world. It compels the class antagonism between capital and labor which wisdom requires that we lessen, not increase, if we are to remain a free people; and makes possible an ultimate interference of foreign nations in our labor disputes at the instance of residents of our own country.

I regret, sir, that this has been a long and tedious process, but its importance could be satisfied in no other way. It has shown us the treaty takes Germany's territory, European and foreign, without compensation; that it takes from her practically all of her ocean shipping, and a large portion of her inland vessels; that it deprives her of all special benefits of treaties and conventions; that it takes her cables; that it compels her to supply large quantities of raw materials; that it internationalizes her great river systems and throws them open to traffic of all nations on a national basis, as if they were the high seas; that it opens her coastwise shipping to all nations; that it compels her to grant exceptional import and export privileges and to accept important restrictions; that it lays down far-reaching principles governing her internal commerce and transportation; that it closes out German interests in practically the whole civilized world (outside the territories of her late allies) — including those areas which have been taken from her

and given to others; that it closes out the interests of that same world in Germany. It has shown that having done all this it assesses against her provisionally, with a stipulation permitting an increase, a debt of one hundred and twenty billion gold marks, which is in addition to the property restored in kind and to the value of the boats, gold and securities delivered; that it makes her responsible for these damages inflicted not only by herself, but by her allies, and even by the allied and associated powers themselves, with a list of items which includes some admittedly contrary to the rules of international law hitherto existing; and that finally and in addition she is compelled to answer to her own nationals for the value of the property taken by the allied and associated powers.

It remains for me to add that the United States is bound up in every one of the obligations and duties incident to the enforcement of these terms with the great responsibilities attached thereto.

We are participants, either as one of the principal allied and associated powers, or as a member of the council of the league of nations, in the Belgian, Saar Basin, Czecho-Slovak State, Polish, Free City of Danzig, and Schleswig boundary commissions. We are in like manner participants in the Saar Basin governing commission with all the inevitable difficulties and dangers attached thereto. We participate in plebiscite commissions of Poland, Schleswig, and East Prussia, and the inter-allied military, naval and aeronautical commissions of control charged with enforcing the disarmament provisions of this treaty. In addition we have our own prisoners and graves commissions, our own clearing offices if we adopt that method of adjusting the enumerated debts. Finally, we are one of the four powers whose representatives are to sit as a reparation commission to assess damages against Germany, to appraise credits, to judge of her economic requirements as affecting her ability to furnish certain raw materials, to pass on her tax system, to postpone payment on her debts, to prescribe the conditions of her bonds, to recommend abatement of her debt, to appraise the value of public property in ceded territories, and a great bulk of other duties that need not be here referred to, all of which may make

or break the peace of Europe, with an obligation on our part that having so participated in the breaking we shall once more contribute our millions of men and our billions of dollars to the readjustments.

In addition to this the United States is to appoint arbitrators to determine the amount of river craft that shall go to France on the Rhine and to the allied and associated powers (including ourselves) on the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and the Danube, and to determine the conditions under which the international convention relative to the St. Gothard railway may be denounced.

Mr. President, the more I consider this treaty, the more I am convinced that the only safe way for us to deal with it is to decline to be a party to it at all. I think we should renounce in favor of Germany any and all claims for indemnity because of the war and see that she gets credit for what we renounce, as indeed she should for the value of all she gives up as against a fixed and ample indemnity. I agree with the President when he says the indemnity should have been a fixed amount. We ought to renounce all participation or membership in commissions, committees, boards or otherwise provided for in the treaty in aid of its execution to which by its terms we are parties. We ought not to accept cessions of German territory. We ought to declare a general policy to regard with concern any threat of disturbance of general world peace, but at the same time we should reserve complete liberty of action either independently or in conjunction with other powers in taking such steps as we determine wise for preserving the peace. We ought then to carry out the spirit of the Act of 1916, which authorized the President to convene the nations of the world together to establish a code of international law, reduce armaments, to establish an international tribunal and go as far as possible in the direction of securing peace through justice, through a league to which all the world are parties in its formation. This would be a fitting, generous and dignified exit from a situation in which primarily we had no direct concern.

It is indeed a hard and cruel peace that this treaty stipulates and I have no objections to its being so, but see no reason why we, who do not partake in its spoils, should become parties to its harshness and cruelty. I see no reason

why we should be parties to imposing upon Germany a treaty whose terms, our negotiators say, she will not be able to meet; a treaty that robs our ancient friend, China, in a way disapproved by our negotiators; a treaty that lays the foundation for centuries of blood letting into which we should not be drawn, a treaty that, contrary to our own judgment, fails to fix the amount of indemnity to be paid, leaving that vast question to the whim of a majority of a commission on reparations, a treaty predicated upon the assertion that a stricken and helpless world requires our counsel and support but leaves to the beneficiaries the decision as to the measure and character of the benefactions they are to receive; a treaty that with ominous words presages our involvement in the eruptions of suppressed volcanic world conditions; a treaty that would require us to underwrite all the regional understandings between nations recognized by the league, most of which are based upon oppression of weaker nations, many of which are as yet secret and undisclosed, and when disclosed might drive us to acts of injustice similar to that in which the President felt himself compelled to acquiesce in the case of Shantung.

The mind stands appalled and refuses to grasp the infinite possibilities which arise from the ramifications of the obligations we are asked to assume. Looking at the treaty as a whole is it to be wondered at that we are asked to guarantee by our arms and our resources the territorial status which it creates.

Sir, I have all but finished. I have not sought to propound or establish any thesis beyond this: The treaty as it stands cannot be enforced. This is admitted by its proponents. The treaty as it stands is but a harbinger of other and greater wars. This being true, the question must come—Why was this treaty so drawn and the vanquished compelled to sign it? It may be when we get all the documents this will appear. And yet in spite of all these great duties and obligations we assume for the future, in spite of our great contribution in men and resources to the successful fruition of the great joint enterprise we entered, it seems to be proposed that we are to waive all participation in the benefits of this treaty, and that we are to add further to the general burdens of the people by ourselves compensating our citizens who have suffered losses in this war.

The weight of the task resting upon us is not light, but the people demand that we fully perform it, in accordance with our sworn duty. We can in this matter take the *ipse dixit* of no man.

I have sought in my remarks to put before the people as tersely as I could the salient features of this treaty, so that knowing them their counsel might assist us in our work. For one of the great defects thus far incident to the treaty is that too few minds have functioned on its provisions, and perusing it one finds it impossible to believe that any responsible mind had sought to coördinate its provisions, and trace out their ultimate logical conclusions.

Nothing in all our history, sir, has called for a clearer perception of present and future, a keener or juster understanding of our free institutions, a clearer vision of the mighty mission of our great nation in the world, or the dedication of a purer and loftier patriotism, than the consideration of this treaty.

Unless, sir, we shall have the guidance of the Infinite wisdom, we shall fail in our duty, and wrecking our beloved country, earn the odium of its treasonable betrayal.

SPEECH OF
GILBERT M. HITCHCOCK

SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

IN THE SENATE, SEPTEMBER 3, 1919

(Reprinted from Congressional Record)

MR. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President, the action of the Committee on Foreign Relations upon the pending peace treaty has been foreshadowed by the progress of that treaty through the committee so that we may now clearly see what issue it is which is to be presented by that committee to the Senate of the United States. By a vote of nine to eight the committee has formally decided to adopt amendments to the treaty which are absolutely destructive of America's participation in it. By this vote the committee has raised the issue squarely if indirectly whether this nation is to participate in the treaty which has been negotiated after such a long struggle at Paris and Versailles, or whether it is to discard all the provisions in that treaty that are for the benefit of the United States, whether this government is to desert at this juncture the nations with which we have been associated during the war and stand before the world unwilling to carry to their whole limit the steps necessary to perpetuate the victory which our arms in connection with those of the other nations achieved. The committee does not do this by a direct and specific proposal to reject the treaty. Although a majority of the committee is in favor of that action, they seem to hesitate at taking it. They prefer by indirection to accomplish the same thing; that is, by adopting amendments which make the treaty impossible.

Mr. President, I shall not discuss the merit of any of the amendments. It is utterly unimportant to consider whether they are good, bad, or indifferent. The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. ROBINSON] has discussed the Shantung amendment, which is said to have the strongest

sentiment back of it. The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. McCUMBER] has made an absolutely unanswerable argument to demonstrate that the adoption of the so-called amendment relating to Shantung can not by any possibility benefit China, in whose interest it is assumed to be proposed.

I repeat that I am not going to discuss the nature of the amendments; but I lay down this proposition, and I challenge anybody to meet it: That the adoption of any amendment to this treaty — and the committee proposes many — means its defeat so far as we are concerned.

Fortunately neither this committee nor the Senate possesses the power to defeat the treaty. It will go on; it will go into effect; it will be in effect in a few weeks; for its provisions are that when three of the great powers in addition to Germany have ratified it, it goes into operation. Great Britain as well as Belgium has done so; France will do so within a very short time; Italy and Japan will undoubtedly follow in rapid succession; and the treaty, so far as those nations are concerned, will be in effect.

How about the United States? We shall be in the attitude, if we follow the policy of folly which the committee is pursuing, of proposing amendments which are certain to be rejected. Does anybody suppose that if the Senate adopts the so-called Shantung amendment, and if the President, in the exercise of his power, sends it to Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan for concurrence that any one of them will concur in it. Such action is impossible and unthinkable. Great Britain has ratified the treaty, and she will stand by that ratification; France will ratify it, and so will Japan and Italy. Japan certainly would never consent to have herself humiliated in the eyes of the world and be compelled to have the provisions changed as the committee proposes. Great Britain, France, and Italy are under a treaty obligation with Japan to stand by her in the disposition of the German interests in the Shantung. How absurd, then, to suppose that those nations will violate their contract, will repudiate their obligation to Japan, even if Japan's consent could be secured.

But, moreover, be it remembered that France, Great

Britain, and Italy have enormous benefits in this treaty. They can not afford to endanger it, even if they would be willing to affront Japan. They know, if the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations do not know, that these nations possess no further power to compel Germany to make any concessions. Gathered in council at Versailles, they said to Germany, "Sign; sign within so many days; sign here; and ratify within such a time." Germany did it. When Germany did that thing she ended compulsion. Any change in the treaty, any new treaty made with Germany, can not be made under compulsion; it can only be made by negotiation. Does anybody suppose that Germany is in any frame of mind at the present time to negotiate?

So I say, Mr. President, that any proposed amendment to this treaty, whether it is the dotting of an "i" or the crossing of a "t," whether it is good, bad, or indifferent, means that the United States retires from the treaty. We might as well meet that issue here and now. It would be a great deal better faith if the Senators who propose to advocate these amendments did so frankly and declared that they were in favor of rejecting the treaty.

Mr. WILLIAMS. As the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. KNOX] has done.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes, Mr. President, as the Senator from Mississippi says, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. KNOX] has done so. Much as I condemn the attitude that the Senator from Pennsylvania took here a few days ago, it must be admitted that he is at least entitled to the credit of candor and courage in taking it. He seems to have wearied of voting for amendments to kill the treaty; he seems to have realized that he would ultimately be forced into the open; that he would have to admit that the amendments would kill it, and that a virtue might as well be made of necessity at once.

Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. President —

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield to the Senator from Washington?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I will yield for a question, but not for delay.

Mr. POINDEXTER. It is only a question which I desire to ask.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Make it very short, if the Senator please.

Mr. POINDEXTER. I understand the Senator's attitude to be that —

Mr. HITCHCOCK. If the Senator will permit me, I will state my attitude, but if he will ask any question, I shall be very glad to answer it.

Mr. POINDEXTER. Does the Senator advocate the ratification of this treaty by the United States without the crossing of a "t" or the dotting of an "i," regardless of the character of the treaty or the effect it will have upon the vital interests of the United States?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I favor the unqualified ratification of this treaty at the earliest possible date, regardless of any arguments that Senators may make as to the interests of the United States. My investigation shows me that if we do not ratify it our material interests will suffer tremendously; and I shall undertake to show that before I get through.

Senators here have denounced and condemned the league of nations as altruistic, as an attempt upon the part of the United States to benefit the whole world, sacrificing somewhat, as they claim, the material interests of the United States. Those same Senators come here now and defend a destruction of the very important material interests and national interests which this treaty, secured from Germany at the point of the cannon, provides for the United States.

Suppose we fail to ratify this treaty, suppose we adopt an amendment which defeats the treaty, where will the United States stand? It will stand as a deserter, in the first place, in the great cause in which we enlisted when we entered this war; it will stand as a deserter, leaving the nations associated with us to enforce, as they must, the terms of this treaty against Germany; it will stand as a poltroon amongst the nations of the world, begging Germany for terms of peace.

Mr. FRANCE. Mr. President —

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield to the Senator from Maryland?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Very briefly, if it is a question simply, but not for delay.

Mr. FRANCE. Is the Senator aware of the fact that the British labor party, representing 20,000,000 of the British working men, have condemned this treaty in unequivocal terms?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No, I am not; and I do not care what they have done.

Mr. President, if the United States takes the position to which I have referred it is then reduced to one of two alternatives: Either it must go hat in hand to Germany and ask Germany to enter into negotiations for a peace settlement, or it must, as some Senators have recommended, pass a resolution in Congress declaring that we have reached an unconditional peace with Germany.

Mr. FRANCE. Mr. President —

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield further to the Senator from Maryland?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Under the same conditions, I yield.

Mr. FRANCE. I did not understand the Senator's reply. Does he deny that the great British Labor Party, which will undoubtedly control the destiny of Great Britain after the next election, is unequivocally opposed to the league of nations?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I deny it because I do not know it, and I do not care if it is so.

Mr. FRANCE. Mr. President --

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I ask the Senator not to interrupt me further; it does not comport with what I am saying, and I do not want to have the continuity of my remarks destroyed.

Unquestionably, Mr. President, the treaty is going to be in operation very soon and the United States will be out in the cold.

I have said that we will be confronted with two alternatives; either we will have to go to Germany and ask Germany to negotiate a treaty of peace settlement with us, or we will have to adopt a resolution — a concurrent resolution, as the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from New Mexico have advocated — declaring a state of unconditional peace with Germany.

Where, then, are the issues of the war with Germany? We leave Germany angry and resentful toward the United States because we, the great democracy on the

western hemisphere, threw our weight into the conflict and defeated her. We lose all the benefits and provisions of this treaty, and Germany will be free to assert against the United States enormous claims, which she undoubtedly will make, for indemnity. Germany declared no war against us; she will be in a position to say to us, "You declared war against Germany; we did not want war with the United States. You seized the property of thousands of German nationals in the United States contrary to the treaties of 1799 and 1828; you liquidated that property in violation of international law; your Congress has taken possession of it; we want an indemnity." We would have with Germany on that account alone, for years to come, a controversy which would inevitably in time run into the dangers of war.

Mr. PITTMAN. Mr. President —

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield to the Senator from Nevada?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I yield.

Mr. PITTMAN. The Senator is referring to the contention that Germany would undoubtedly make. He does not of course adopt that contention himself.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No; I am adopting the contention which Germany would make and which Germany has made since this treaty was signed. Since Germany has realized what we have done in this country — and rightfully done, as I believe — her papers have been aflame with indignation that we have done it. Under the treaty Germany validates the acts of Congress, she validates the acts of the Alien Property Custodian under which we have seized from \$750,000,000 to \$1,000,000,000 worth of property belonging to German nationals and hold it. Under this treaty we can hold the proceeds of the sale of that property not only to indemnify ourselves for pre-war losses, not only to indemnify ourselves for losses similar to those occasioned by the sinking of the *Lusitania*, but also to indemnify and pay the claims of Americans against Germany and against German nationals. What becomes of that? Who is to look out for the payment of claims which German nationals owe to American nationals, if we lose this protection? What is going to become of this \$700,000,000 or \$800,000,000

of property in the United States which, in the eyes of Germany, if this treaty is not signed, still belong to German nationals? Senators who are so fond of measuring the material interests of the United States and the nationalism of our country against great world benefit had better think before they reject this treaty and throw the United States into a controversy with Germany which may last for years and may lead to war.

Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. President —

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield to the Senator from Washington?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Under the same conditions, yes.

Mr. POINDEXTER. Does the Senator mean to say that he would sacrifice the national interests of the United States of America, one of the Commonwealths of which he, in part, represents here in the Senate, for the sake of what he calls world benefits?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I mean to say that the Senators who undertake to advise the United States to play the part of a poltroon and deserter and get out of this treaty would not only put themselves in a bad moral attitude but they would sacrifice these enormous material interests as well.

Mr. POINDEXTER. Does the Senator agree with the President of the United States who denominates this treaty as a supreme sacrifice by the people of the United States?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President, it is a great act, an altruistic act, for the United States to throw its strength into the society of nations and propose to steady the world in this hour of danger. Undoubtedly the United States is able to confer upon the world at this time a benefit greater than any other country can confer. The United States is young; the United States is strong; the United States is rich. It alone of all the nations of the world is able at the present moment to confer upon the world, the distressed and despairing world, benefits such as no other nation can confer. It is an act of altruism; but I am pointing out to Senators that what they propose is going to sacrifice some of the precious material interests about which they are talking all the time.

Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. President, I assume from what the Senator says that he cares nothing whatever, since he

speaks of them rather contemptuously, for the material interests of the United States.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I am attempting to show the Senator that he and his associates are attempting to sacrifice, and propose to sacrifice, the very material interests for which they assume to stand.

Mr. POINDEXTER. I say to the Senator that he is here as a Senator sworn to protect and guard the material interests of the people of the United States.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I have submitted to all the interruptions I propose to; but I will say to the Senator also that I propose to stand by that oath; and I am standing by it when I insist upon the ratification of this treaty.

Mr. POINDEXTER. I should like to ask the Senator one other question.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I can not submit to any further questions. I decline to yield further at the present time.

Mr. President, one of the declarations made in this treaty by Germany is that she assumes full responsibility for this war. If we retire from the treaty she will not assume toward us full responsibility for this war. She will seek to hold us to that responsibility, and in German eyes and in German minds she will have considerable warrant for that claim.

In this treaty Germany agrees to pay damages. Now, it is up to Congress when the time comes to decide whether or not we will insist upon what we are entitled to under this treaty; but certainly we should not release Germany from that promise.

The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. KNOX] comes boldly before the Senate and before the country and pleads the German cause. He makes very much the same arguments that the German peace commission made in its communications to the peace conference representing the nations of the world. He makes practically the same arguments against indemnities, the same arguments against excesses, which they made and which the peace conference representing the other nations answered. It is only necessary to read those communications to see where the Senator from Pennsylvania derived his thoughts.

Mr. President, there are many other benefits which the

United States derives under this treaty, and which the majority of the committee on foreign relations proposes to sacrifice.

The treaty provides that for six months after its ratification Germany will impose no higher customs duties upon imports, as against the nations which sign this treaty, than the customs duties which prevailed for the first six months of 1914. As against the United States, if we failed to join in executing the treaty, she could put in any tariff she pleased.

She promises that she will not prohibit or restrict the importation of goods from any of the countries signing this treaty, but there will be no such promises in regard to the United States.

She promises that there will be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against any of the nations signing this treaty, but she would not make that promise to us if we did not enter into the treaty.

She promises that there shall be no discrimination in shipping, based on the flag of any country signing this treaty, in any of the German ports. There are no such promises to us if we fail to sign the treaty.

In this treaty Germany agrees that the nations which sign it can revive, in their own discretion, such former treaties as existed with Germany, but that promise will not exist, so far as we are concerned, if we fail to enter this treaty.

In this treaty Germany promises to restore the property of our citizens seized in Germany or to compensate the owners. No such promise would exist if we failed to ratify the treaty. All American property in Germany would be subject to confiscation.

Many other promises of that sort are made. I shall not here catalogue them all. Some of them are less important than those I have cited and some of them are fully as important.

I desire, however, to mention another thing of tremendous value in the United States which is provided for in this treaty, and which we will lose if we amend it, because if we amend it we kill it as far as we are concerned. We lose our membership on the great commission of reparation. Do Senators realize what that commission is to be?

Each of the nations — the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the Jugo-Slovene State — is to have membership on that commission. Only five nations, however, are to participate in any of its decisions. The United States will always participate. Sometimes Japan will, sometimes the Jugo-Slovene State will, sometimes Belgium will, but always the United States will participate in every one of its decisions. Do Senators realize the tremendous power of this commission? Do they know that it holds the power over Germany to compel her to use all her economic resources to the very limit for carrying out the promises of this treaty? Do they realize that that commission receives from Germany all of the reparation which Germany pays, and distributes it to the various countries? Do they realize that that commission has the power to say to Germany how much she shall pay out in gold, what she shall pay out in other forms of property, and how the bonds that she is compelled to execute shall be deposited and distributed? Do they realize, moreover, that this commission has the power to say to Germany: "You are importing too much; you have got to economize; you can not pay your debts; you can not comply with the terms of this treaty unless you cut down your imports"? Do Senators realize what that means? It means that the reparation commission can say to Germany: "Cut down your imports of cotton, cut down your imports of wheat, cut down your imports of copper and other mining products, cut down your imports of agricultural and manufactured food." Do Senators think that the United States can afford not to have representation on that powerful commission? How else are you going to protect the exports of the United States in cotton, copper, wheat, cattle, and all the other products which we hope to sell to Germany, in common with the rest of the world? How are we to protect ourselves against discrimination, as against the rest of the world, if we have no membership upon that commission?

Mr. President, to my mind it is unthinkable for the United States not to be represented on this great, powerful, international body, holding the control of the economic resources of Germany and having the power, until she makes a final settlement, to dictate to her what shall be

done with her products, where they shall be sent, and what she shall import. We can not afford not to be represented on that commission, and we can not be represented on it if we retire from this treaty.

I am talking material things; I am talking national interests now, that Senators have been disposed to bring into the foreground as the only things to be considered. What do they propose? How do they propose to protect American exports — wheat, cotton, cattle, mining products? How do they propose to see that America gets her share?

The commission is going to be in operation, and it is going to be in operation very soon, and it is going to use its powers, and the United States is going to be in competition with Great Britain and France and Japan and other countries; and we can not afford not to be represented on that powerful committee, possessing these enormous powers. The disasters to be contemplated by our retirement from this commission are, to my mind, appalling disasters to our commerce, disasters to our banking interests, disasters to us politically in the larger sense, because it means the isolation of the United States in the world. It means that we affront Japan; it means that we lose our control over the benefits that Germany must pay out in settlement of this war; it means that we leave Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the other twenty-odd nations that sign this treaty in a combination, and we, having secured the hatred of Germany and of Japan, will also earn and merit the contempt of the nations that we desert at this time. Political isolation for the United States — that is what retirement from this treaty means, and it means nothing less.

Mr. President, that is the program of the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee. The majority of the Foreign Relations Committee does not represent the dominant majority of this Chamber. It is a committee organized for the very purpose of seizing this treaty and impounding it, holding it there in cold storage, as it has done now for weeks, since the 10th of July, as I recall, because it went to the Foreign Relations Committee within two weeks after it was signed, and there it remains practically in cold storage. That committee does not

represent the dominant element of the Senate. The majority of the Senate wants that treaty ratified. The overwhelming majority of the American people want it ratified. I have shown here by incontrovertible evidence from time to time that almost invariably, when a test of public opinion has been made in Republican or Democratic communities, the overwhelming sentiment has been shown to be in favor of the ratification of this treaty. Yet that committee, formed and stacked for the purpose, has locked up this great treaty while the whole world is on fire. While our industrial and commercial and financial conditions are imperiled, that committee holds the treaty locked up there, conducting useless hearings about impossible features of the treaty.

But finally the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. KNOX] comes frankly into the open and, in his speech of Friday last, takes a position which, as I have said, at least possesses the merit of candor. Some time last October the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. KNOX], in a speech in this Chamber, stated that the war could only be brought to a conclusion by a treaty, and that the Senate had to participate in the making of the treaty. Now he takes a different position. Now he comes before the Senate and states:

On the other hand, Congress, while it cannot negotiate a peace with the enemy, can nevertheless end hostilities with him by declaring as no longer existent the status of war with him, which the Congress created by its own act.

Thus so soon as the first *procès-verbal* is drawn under this treaty, Congress may with all propriety, and should to insure full legality to the act of the Executive in negotiating this particular treaty provision, pass a resolution — concurrent, because the Executive having already committed himself to the substance thereof, his approval would be superfluous — which shall declare that the status of war created by its resolution of April 6, 1917, no longer exists, and that a status of peace from that moment obtains. Thus we shall put the country immediately upon a complete peace basis and may at once resume all our normal commercial and other relations with Germany, unhampered by any restrictions. So much for that part of the treaty which ends the war.

The Senator from Pennsylvania takes the preposterous position that because France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and the other belligerents in the war have made a peace settlement with Germany therefore we are at peace with Germany. It is an absolutely unthinkable condition. What are the terms of the peace? What have become of

our former treaties with Germany? Who is to pay the damages of the war with Germany? What are our rights in German ports? Can our shipping be discriminated against? Can Germany make tariffs adverse to us? All those questions remain unsettled, and they were considered important enough in the peace conference in Paris to take up the time of the negotiators for months. And yet the Senator from Pennsylvania blandly says we can now have an unconditional peace with Germany.

There has been a most tremendous change since October, 1918. What was then the position of the Senator from Pennsylvania? What was then the position of the Senator from Washington [Mr. POINDEXTER], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BRANDEGEE], and all these other Senators who are now so anxious to make an unconditional peace with Germany? Mr. President, even when the President of the United States had simply answered a diplomatic note from Germany asking for terms of armistice, this Chamber rang with denunciations by Republican Senators, who said nothing but an unconditional surrender of Germany. They shouted until the rafters rang with the statement that we could not possibly have a negotiated peace with Germany. "Unconditional surrender!" And now they come here and blandly propose an unconditional peace. Then they protested that it would be an outrage for the United States to act independently of the nations associated with us in the war, and now they come and denounce the President because in association with those nations he has made a peace with Germany and imposed the terms of unconditional surrender on Germany.

Mr. President, why this change? What has happened? Has the President done anything more or different from what he had been required to do? Did any senator rise here in his place, before the peace conference met in Paris, and insist that the United States should make a separate peace with Germany? I do not remember any. There were none until the present time, when there is a fond hope to discredit the President of the United States now just as they attempted to discredit him then because they thought he might make a separate peace with Germany.

Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. President —

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield to the Senator from Washington?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Under the same condition as before.

Mr. POINDEXTER. The Senator mentioned my name. I do not care to ask a question. I was just going to make a brief statement.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I will ask the Senator to postpone that brief statement.

I will read first from some things said by the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. KNOX]. This was October 28, 1918. He said:

It was always true and was early recognized by all that the object of this war was and is the permanent removal of the German menace.

Not the temporary, but "the permanent."

In the formula "restitution, reparation, and guaranties," the word guaranty is not to mean written guaranties, such as we have seen treated as scraps of paper in the cases of Belgium's neutrality, of accepted international law, of Hague conventions, of the rules of civilized warfare on land and seas. We shall have the guaranties we seek only when we know as a fact, irrespective of the solemnities of diplomatic promises, that the German menace is at an end once for all.

How can it be at an end once for all if a treaty does not go into effect? Can it be put into effect by an unconditional deed, by a concurrent resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives that peace has arrived because we have quit fighting?

Even "restitution and reparation"; even the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France; even just frontiers for Italy and Roumania and the rescue and restoration of Russia and independence for Jugo-Slavs, Czecho-Slovaks, and Poles, and for the nationalities oppressed by Turkey; even the liberation of Africans and others from German colonial oppression — all these matters — however absolute their intrinsic importance — for the prime purpose of the war, which is, I say again, for our guaranty against the German menace — are of chief interest because they subserve that guaranty.

Yet now the Senator from Pennsylvania proposes to scuttle and run and leave the other nations that were associated with us in the war to make good those guaranties?

We shall require also evidence that the German grip upon Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey has been loosed. We must never allow to be obscured the prime purpose of the war. From that purpose flows as a corollary the purpose to strive to make the menace of unjust war from any quarter as improbable as we can.

What are we going to do with Russia? What is to achieve this purpose if we make an unconditional peace with Germany by a joint or concurrent resolution?

From that, again, and from the chivalrous spirit of the entente allies flows the demands for restitution and reparation and for all the complicated territorial and racial readjustments, to some of which I have referred.

And now the Senator from Pennsylvania stands upon the floor and denounces the treaty because it gives to the nations of the world reparation and restitution and he proposes that the United States shall waive any claim that it has against Germany, the thing which is provided for in the treaty, and he says with a most naïve humor that when the United States waives its claim against Germany it should see to it that the other nations give Germany credit for what we release. How are we going to do that if we are not a party to the treaty? What right have we to say to Great Britain and France and the other nations that get restitution, "You ought not to press Germany so far if we are not a party to the treaty"? Does the Senator from Pennsylvania think that we can desert our associates and leave them to enforce the terms of this treaty alone and then see that they give Germany credit for what we have sacrificed?

Mr. McCORMICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Such a policy of folly and poltroonery was never proposed on the floor of the Senate before.

I yield to the Senator from Illinois for a brief question.

Mr. McCORMICK. I only wish to ask if in that connection it would be consistent for us to interfere with Greece obtaining Thrace or Italy obtaining Fiume?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The Senator is very desirous on all occasions of bringing in some other subject. I am confining myself to this treaty and the effect which will be produced if we adopt amendments and therefore destroy our participation in the treaty. I do not propose on this occasion to discuss either the labor situation in Great Britain or any of the remote diplomatic questions of the East.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I yield.

Mr. WADSWORTH. The Senator was speaking a moment ago, as I understood him, about claims of the United States exercised under this treaty.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Will the Senator recite what claims the United States is pressing under the treaty? I thought the United States was not to get anything.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The United States can hardly be said to be in the attitude of pressing claims, but under the terms of the treaty it is entitled to all the claims that any other participant in the treaty is entitled to, equally situated. I do not suppose that the Congress of the United States would care to compel Germany to pay the cost of American intervention. Other nations may do so; I do not know whether they will or not; but whatever the United States shall do is at least reserved for the Government of the United States to decide after the treaty is ratified. Then will be the time if Senators are anxious to sacrifice American claims for the benefit of Germany to do so, but we can not do that unless we are a party to this treaty.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I understand that the President has already stated officially, or in such way as to have it understood, that the United States does not intend to collect anything from Germany.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. There has been no statement of that sort made to Germany.

Mr. WADSWORTH. He made it to the people of the United States.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The President has perhaps made it in his discussions, and possibly in association with the representatives of other nations in Europe echoed the sentiment, which I believe is general in this country, that this country does not propose to exact a pound of flesh from Germany, that this country is going to hold to a high altruistic position, but that is no reason why we should not sign the treaty. If we want to collect an indemnity from Germany in any form under the terms of the treaty, we can if desired be generous and give it back to her, provided we sign the treaty.

Mr. WILLIAMS. As we did in the Boxer case.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes; as the Senator from Mississippi suggests, as we did in the Boxer case.

Mr. McCUMBER. Mr. President —

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I yield to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. McCUMBER. As a matter of fact, whatever right we obtain under the treaty is a right obtained in favor of the United States, and neither the President nor anyone else but Congress can renounce those rights. Is not that correct?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. That is correct, Congress, with the approval of the President. It requires the whole Government of the United States as I understand it.

Mr. McCUMBER. It is the Government which must renounce and not the President.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. In his speech the other day the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. KNOX] made this declaration:

And this thought brings me to speak again of what I have said heretofore, that this treaty, stripped of its meaningless beatific provisions —

Whatever they are —

provides merely and simply for an alliance between the five great powers in a coalition against the balance of the world. And again I ask, has history ever answered this save in one way — by destroying the coalition and at times all or some of its constituent members?

Aside from the inaccuracies of this statement, which implies that only five great powers are in the treaty, whereas there are twenty-seven signers as I recall it, embracing a very wide scope of nations all over the world — aside from the inaccuracies of the statement made by the Senator from Pennsylvania last Friday, contrast it with the statements he made a year ago upon the floor of the Senate on the 28th day of October, when he said:

The league of nations that now challenges our solicitude is the league of nations of which we are now a member — the glorious present alliance of the many powers with whom we are now fighting as a league to enforce and to maintain peace from disturbance by the German menace.

Not merely to fight the war, but to establish and maintain peace. The Senator from Pennsylvania last October denominated as a glorious league of nations that which he now condemns as an alliance inimical to the world. He called it a "glorious alliance."

He continues:

If we should allow that league to fall apart or to be pried apart by German machinations, who can say when this world will ever again be so near to having a general league to enforce peace as it is to-day?

And yet the Senator from Pennsylvania and his associates upon the Committee on Foreign Relations now deliberately propose to pry apart this glorious alliance of which he sounded the praises only last October when he thought he could bring by his declaration condemnation upon the President of the United States. I do not assert that it is being pried apart by German machinations, but I heard in the Senator's speech a very distinct appeal to German sentiment, and I would suggest to the Senator from Pennsylvania, if he really desires to plead German sentiment to the logical conclusion, German sentiment in Europe or in America, that he suggest that the United States make reparation to Germany for the damage she suffered by our entry into the war. That would be logical.

The Senator from Pennsylvania then proceeded last October:

Out of the present alliance to-day, and quite irrespective of any discussions with the enemy, it would seem possible to perpetuate the league we have, already embracing the majority of the population of the globe, as a league for one single purpose of enforcing peace.

Perpetuate, he said, the league we have. Now he proposes to disrupt it and break it up when the President of the United States has done the very thing the Senator then declared should be done.

The function of such a league, I take it, would be to examine any controversy that threatened war and then to throw its weight to the side of such controversy where justice and equity lay, and also to suppress with its overwhelming power any war that might break out and to indicate the just solution of the contention. Such a league, like any league, will demand some encroachment upon the conception of complete and independent sovereignty.

But the Senator from Pennsylvania advocated it only last October and now he denounces it and attempts to do the very thing that he then condemned, namely, to pry apart what he then denominated as a "glorious league" or a "glorious alliance."

But enough of the Senator from Pennsylvania, and yet not enough. I forgot one thing concerning the Senator from Pennsylvania which I want to include.

On the 17th of July the Senate had under consideration a resolution presented by the Senator from Pennsylvania, which had for its purpose to tear out of this treaty the league of nations. I am not going to discuss the league of nations. The Senator from Pennsylvania is on both sides of the fence, just as is the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE], and many other Senators who now oppose it, but I want to read what the Senator from Pennsylvania said on July 17 of this year. He said:

The resolution before us does not call for a vote for or against the league of nations; it does not call for even an expression of an opinion either for or against the league. On these points this resolution is wholly colorless. This resolution asks merely and solely that the treaty embodying the league shall be in words so framed that the Senate may advise and consent to that part of it —

That is, that part of the treaty —

which shall bring us peace, and that it may reserve for further consideration that part of it by which it is proposed to make us a part of a projected league of nations.

What has come over the spirit of the dreams of the Senator from Pennsylvania that has brought about this change since July 17? Then he wanted to tear the league of nations out of the treaty and ratify the rest of it. Now he proposes that we withdraw from the treaty absolutely. I suspect this has come to his attention, that he could not eliminate the league of nations from the treaty. A majority of the Senate is determined to see the league of nations remain in the treaty. Having reached that conclusion he now takes the position that the only hope is to defeat the whole treaty. I suppose that is the explanation of the otherwise inexplicable change made by the Senator from Pennsylvania.

I said that this Chamber rang last October with declarations of Senators that the United States must be a party to a treaty, that this treaty must be imposed on Germany by force, and that the United States must unite with the allied nations in imposing the treaty, and they must not on any account negotiate a treaty separately with Germany. I will just state haphazard a few statements made by Senators on that subject.

On October 14, 1918, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. NEW] said:

I am against a negotiated peace now, as I have been from the moment the United States entered the war. Nothing short of absolute, complete, and unconditional surrender, carrying with it full reparation for the damage wrought, will be accepted or tolerated, and it is my belief that anything that has even the appearance of willingness to accept anything less will be taken as a failure to carry out the purposes for which we entered this war and will be resented with a unanimity and an emphasis that will permit of no misunderstanding.

We have neither hope nor desire to regain the fabulous sums of money we have spent and may yet spend before the end is reached. But, sir, while all this is true, I do not believe that the American people will wittingly or complacently submit to seeing themselves placed at a permanent and irremediable commercial disadvantage through the medium of the terms of peace, whenever or wherever they may be submitted.

And yet the Senator from Indiana now proposes by the action he takes in the Committee on Foreign Relations to commit the United States to a separate peace with Germany, unconditional if need be. He undertakes by his vote to deprive the United States of the great benefits which that treaty secured at the cannon's mouth and leave the United States helpless, burdened with a controversy with Germany, which may last for years and may lead to war. There is a wonderful change there in attitude.

Mr. WALSH of Montana. Mr. President —

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. WALSH of Montana. I desire to know if the position of the Senator, as to any treaty that shall be hereafter made with Germany, if this is rejected, is that it must be a negotiated and not a dictated treaty? Why could we not dictate another treaty with Germany as this has been dictated? Does the military situation render that impracticable?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I, perhaps, have not been specific enough on that point, and I thank the Senator from Montana for calling it to my attention.

I have stated that compulsion was exhausted when we laid down in the treaty which our representatives signed the terms with Germany. When Germany signed, and certainly when the German assembly ratified it, Germany accepted the stipulations and it is too late for us to go to Germany, it is too late to reassemble the council in Paris and have the council undertake to say to Germany, "You must accept this change." Our allies' armies have been demobilized, our Army has been brought home, and,

even if that were not the case, diplomatic usage and international law will excuse Germany from further concessions.

Germany would have a right to say if we asked new conditions, "We accepted this treaty; we have signed this treaty; we have ratified the treaty; and any further changes you want in the treaty you have got to secure from us, and we will impose the terms." Germany can take that position; and because Germany can take that position, none of the other nations — Great Britain, France, or Japan — will take any chances in encouraging us to make impossible amendments; they will not risk their hold on Germany by any such act; and I can not think that the Senate of the United States will be guilty of that ridiculous folly.

Mr. WILLIAMS. If the Senator will pardon me one question, even if we could resubmit the council that made this treaty, and even if we could make Germany by compulsion accept a virtually new treaty or amended treaty, what reason could there be why the council could not meet once a month or once a week and still compel Germany once a month or once a week to accept a new treaty?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Certainly.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Would there ever be any finality about it at all?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. There never would be any finality. That shows the preposterous nature of the suggestion, if there be such a suggestion; and I have not heard any deliberate suggestion from Senators who advocate an unconditional peace. They have simply come down from unconditional surrender to unconditional peace, and they give no reasons.

The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE], on October 10 of last year, used this language:

Mr. President, in the principles, with many of which I find no fault — in the principles laid down of the 14 points or 4 points I find nothing that is satisfactory to me at least about reparation.

The Senator from Massachusetts was then criticizing and condemning the President of the United States because he did not demand reparation, but now he is supporting and backing up the Senator from Pennsylvania

[Mr. KNOX] who denounces reparation. Later in the same speech the Senator from Massachusetts said:

Though I think we ought to have a large reparation for some of our merchants ships and for our passengers who went down on the *Lusitania*, the world ought to have, must have, large reparation. There is such a thing as retributive justice; there is such a thing as punitive justice.

Now, the Senator from Massachusetts, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, is coöperating with Senators constituting a majority of that committee who propose that the United States shall back out of and run away from the only possible means by which we can enforce reparation and justice, and he is willing absolutely to deprive us of membership upon the commission which is to make permanent the achievements of this war.

Later on, the Senator from Massachusetts said:

Mr. President, the best diplomatists in Europe at this moment are the armies of France and Italy, of England, and of the United States. The best men to carry on discussion with Germany are Haig and Pershing and Diaz and, over all, the great commander, Marshal Foch. Those are the negotiators with whom I would leave the question of peace. They will win it. They will win it on German soil. They will bring back the peace which the whole American people desire, for they desire, I believe, unconditional surrender; and unconditional surrenders are not obtained by clever discussion and exchange of notes. They are won by armies in the field.

Now the Senator from Massachusetts and his associates upon the committee propose to repudiate those negotiators, those military forces that negotiated this peace and secured these concessions; they propose to repudiate those negotiators they then glorified and come down to an exchange of notes with Germany. Later on in the same speech the Senator from Massachusetts said:

The way to compel the peace of the world is to break Germany down and make her accept our terms.

He did not want the President of the United States to do anything which would impair that great purpose. He continues:

The Republican —

Here we get a little partnership —

The Republican —

That is, as distinguished from the Democratic President —

The Republican stands for unconditional surrender and complete victory, just as Grant stood. My own belief is that the American people mean to have an unconditional surrender. They mean to have a dictated peace and not a negotiated peace. That is my own belief here deeper in my heart than any belief I have ever had.

What is the reason for the change? Now that we have secured a dictated peace, do we propose to abandon it at the suggestion of the majority of the Committee on Foreign Relations and enter upon negotiations to secure a peace? It is because the President of the United States has secured the benefits of a dictated peace and they want to discredit him.

Again, on another day in the Senate, October 7, 1918, the Senator from Massachusetts used this language:

Mr. President, the mischief is in any discussion of the principles upon which peace should be debated. When Germany has surrendered, when she holds up her hands and says, "We are beaten; what terms will you impose?" then the Allies and the United States can tell her what terms they will impose. There is, there must be, no other end, no other solution.

And yet the Senator from Massachusetts at the present time is cooperating with the Senators who are attempting to bring about directly the opposite solution of that question.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. POINDEXTER] on October 10 of last year said:

The German chancellor can well answer each one of the inquiries of the President in such way as will be most calculated to accomplish his object. He can say that he represents both the Government and the people of Germany, and who can dispute his statement? In this he undoubtedly would be correct, as, for the purposes of this war, there is no difference between the German people and the German Government.

I read that, Mr. President, lest some one may arise here and say that the attitude of the majority of the Committee on Foreign Relations is based upon the fact that we are now dealing with representatives of the German people instead of representatives of the German Empire.

Again, on the 10th of October, 1918, the Senator from Washington [Mr. POINDEXTER] used this language:

We have just heard the views of the Senator from Massachusetts as to the way the war with Germany should end. He is in favor of an unqualified victory; he is in favor of subduing the military power of Germany and of imposing upon her a peace and a reestablishment of conditions after the war to be dictated by the allies.

That is what the Senator from Washington wanted last October. Yet now the Senator is cooperating with those

who seek to destroy the dictated peace and relegate the United States to the uncertainties of a negotiated peace.

I could cite the statements of other Senators and will cite something by one of the Senators now determined on destroying this treaty. On October 14 last the Senator from Missouri [Mr. REED] used this language:

An unfortunate impression is, I fear, being made upon the country. Nothing in the Senate does aught to add thereto. It seems to me that the country is getting the notion that the President of the United States intends to enter upon a system of parleying and negotiations with Germany, and that at the end of the negotiations Germany is to come off unscathed.

I tell you, sirs, when the conditions of peace are written the name of Woodrow Wilson will not be, it can not be, subscribed to any treaty that does not compel Germany to tread the wine press of repentance — to pay back, to pay back to the world, as far as she can, in her own suffering for the agonies that she has wrought, for the desolation she has brought upon the earth.

Yet it is now proposed to destroy this treaty — the only one that can be exacted from Germany by force, the only one that can be imposed upon her — and relegate the United States to a negotiated treaty.

I shall close my references to the speeches of Senators by reading some remarks by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. CUMMINS], who, I have no doubt, stands by those remarks to-day. I read them merely because they express what I believe represents the overwhelming sentiment of the majority of the Senate, including Senators on both sides of the Chamber. The Senator from Iowa, on October 14, 1918, said:

My concern relates mainly to our attitude toward Germany after the victory has been won and after her surrender is complete, for it will be just as fatal to impose inadequate terms through negotiation.

There is but one answer that will meet the demands of justice and satisfy the claims of an outraged world. There must be reparation for the past and security for the future.

First. Germany must pay, pay to the last farthing of her capacity to pay, pay until the generations yet to come will remember and curse the insane ambition which well nigh destroyed civilization itself, and so she will repair in some small measure the destruction she has wrought.

Second. Germany is a menace to mankind, because she has a cruel, wicked, malicious intent toward the remainder of the world, and because she has a powerful Army and Navy to execute her murderous designs. We can not change her intent, for it is the result of years and years of training and teaching in a false and selfish philosophy, but we can disarm her and leave her helpless and harmless.

Viewed from the ordinary standpoint, these terms are severe beyond precedent, but the situation itself has no parallel in history. I understand perfectly that these conditions mean the degradation, possibly the disin-

tegration, of a once mighty nation; but if we are to be safe, if the world is to be secure, they must be imposed.

It will be gratifying to see Germany supplant her existing Government with a better and freer one; but that will not suffice, for republics are as strong in their purposes as autocracies. Oftentimes they are as ambitious as the most absolute of monarchies, and we are now witnessing the ease with which they mobilize and the success with which they fight.

Mr. President, that was the situation a year ago; it was the situation last October. The statements made by those Senators represent not only the overwhelming public opinion of the United States, but they represent practically the unanimous opinion of the Senate of the United States. Many of those remarks were made in criticism of the President because it was thought or assumed that he was going to enter into negotiations with Germany and permit her to escape from the decision of a great military victory; but they were statements just the same, and they are binding upon the Senators who made them. I should like to have those Senators rise upon the floor of the Senate and explain what has caused their change of front and why when they condemned the President of the United States because they thought he proposed to make a separate peace with Germany then, they now condemn him because he has united with the Allies in making peace. I should like to have them rise in their places and explain why they have come down from the heights of unconditional surrender to the depths of unconditional peace. I should like to have them explain why they called loudly for reparation to the uttermost farthing last October and now boldly come here and advocate abandoning all American claims for restitution. I should like to have them explain to the people of the United States how they are going to protect the material interests of the United States if they abdicate and give away the protection of the provisions of this treaty to which I have specifically referred. It can not be done.

The Senators who are taking the course of destroying this treaty by amendments are in a position absolutely inconsistent with that which they held a year ago. They dare not go before the American people and advocate a negotiated peace with Germany. They dare not go before the American people and say: "We are going to waive all the benefits the United States secures from Germany under this treaty—the reparations, the repayment of the loss

of the *Lusitania* and other horrors, the payment of American nationals who have claims against German nationals, the disposition of the German property in this country which the Congress of the United States declared shall be liquidated and wiped out." They dare not go before the people of the United States and say: "We are not going to provide for the protection of American exports, which are going to be largely under the control of the reparations commission of Europe."

Mr. President, I had expected to say something on the league of nations, but I have talked too long already, and I shall postpone that for a future time. I have sought in this address to meet upon their own ground Senators who glorify nationalism and constantly shout for material interests, when other Senators stand here advocating that the United States shall take its great part in reorganizing the world for peace. I have met them upon their own ground to-day, and I should like to have them answer how they can excuse the poltroonery of the United States if it deserts its associates in this war at the very hour when it is necessary to make permanent the achievements of the war.

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